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DESELECTION UNDER HARPER v.
A BLOW FOR MAINTAINING

HEALTHSOURCE:

PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIPS IN
THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE?
Bryan A. Liang*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Managed care has swept the United States and is now the predominant form of health delivery for the vast majority of employed
citizens, with an estimated 190 million patients enrolled in managed
care forms.' As such, an extraordinarily large number of patients and
physicians will have their relationships defined by the managed care
framework for the foreseeable future.
Managed care is a business. 2 As such, it looks to minimize costs
3
and maximize income through whatever methodology is available.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Malibu,
California. B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1983; Ph.D. Harris Graduate
School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago 1989; M.D. Columbia
University, College of Physicians & Surgeons 1991; J.D. Harvard Law School 1995. I
wish to thank Richard Lee for invaluable research assistance.
1 "More than 100 million Americans-two-thirds of the working populationget their health care through a health maintenance organization or preferred provider organization." Denise Smith Amos, Medical BalancingAct: Doctors Weigh Patient
Needy Against nsurers'Rues,ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Apr. 1, 1996, at 10. Seven of ten
insured patients are enrolled in managed care plans. Janice Castro, Who Owns the
Patient,Anyway?, Tr.vm,July 18, 1994, at 38. Fifty million people are enrolled in health
maintenance organizations and 140 million are enrolled in preferred provider organizations, the two predominant managed care forms. Mary Jane Fisher, Health Care
Reform Battles Shifting to States, NAT'L UNDERWRITER & PROP. & CASUALTv-RISK & BENEFrrs MCmr., July 31, 1995, at 9.
2 "'Health care is a big business and doctors need to be held accountable for
their practice.' Managed care insurers hold physicians accountable in several ways:
through oversight controls, financial incentives, and/or punishments and the power
to deselect." Amos, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting John O'Rourke, president of the
Managed Care Association of Metropolitan St. Louis).
3 Indeed, as a business entity, managed care plans act to obtain market share
through other means. For example, in addition to minimizing costs, to obtain access
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When, for example, a managed care organization (MCO) such as a
health maintenance organization (HMO),4 preferred-provider organization (PPO),5 or other MCO attempts to enter a market, it will attempt to secure, or select, the services of as many providers (e.g.,
physicians, hospitals) as possible so that it may offer potential customers (e.g., employers) a desirable product: a cohesive network of physicians, hospitals, and other health care sources covering a large
geographic area which effectively serve the health care requirements
of the employer's employees. However, once the MCO has determined and assessed its market needs, it must adjust its provider base
so as to minimize costs.6 Excess capacity of physicians, hospitals, and
other services must be pared so as to maximize the bottom line.7 This
to markets as indicated infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text, managed care plans
may sign up physicians and then deselect them after securing their patients in the
plan. Jim Montague, Joining the Race: State Medical Societies Ty to Beat Managed Care
Integrators to the Punch, Hosps. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Sept. 5, 1994, at 50; Jim Montague, Striking Back: Managed Care PlansAre DumpingPhysicians, But the Doctors Are Fighting Back, Hosps. & HEALTH NETWORKS, Oct. 20, 1994, at 38.
4 An HMO is an organized health care system that both finances and delivers
health care services to its enrollees or subscribers. An HMO generally contracts
with selected health care providers to arrange for the provision of comprehensive
health care services for its covered members who prepay a fixed amount for care.
PATRICIA YOUNGER ET AL., LEGAL ANSWER BOOK FOR MANAGED CARE 2 (1995).
5 "Preferred provider organizations supply networks of health care providers to
employer health benefit plans and health insurance carriers who wish to purchase
health care services for covered beneficiaries." Id. at 7-8.
6 When managed-care companies move into virgin area, they tend to sign up as
many physicians as possible. After they've determined how many doctors they
need, they often drop some.... [0] nce a plan contracts with a physician, it will
observe his practice patterns [costs]. That [cost] information will be used when
the plan decides to shed doctors.
Ken Terry, Wien Health Plans Don't Want You Anymore, MED. ECON., May 23, 1994, at
138.
7 Edward Hirshfeld describes this evolution of the managed care market in the
context of PPOs versus HMOs. He identifies five phases that represent progressive
penetration of managed care; at phase two, "[a] large percentage of physicians is
recruited to become part of the approved panel from which beneficiaries can obtain
care, reducing concerns over a loss of freedom of choice. This wide choice and lower
price allows them to gain market share more quickly than the HMOs." Edward
Hirshfeld, The Casefor Physician Direction in Health Plans, 2 ANNALS HEALTH L. 81, 88
(1994). The market then continues to evolve and plans reduce costs through deselection of providers "who use more resources per patient than average, or who use more
resources than a predetermined or predicted level," generally without an inquiry as to
why the providers used more or less resources than the predetermined or predicted
level. Id. (citing Deselection Predilection, MED. STAFF & PHYSICIAN ORG. ADVISOR, Mar.
1994, at 1). Note that the focus is cost; indeed, a physician was recognized as the
"physician of the month" and then deselected several months later for exceeding the

1997]

DESELECTION

AND

PATIENT-PHYSICIAN

RELATIONSHIPS

8o

process, particularly for physicians, is accomplished through
deselection. 8
Deselection works through contract principles. Physicians, who
enter into agreements to serve as providers for MCOs must generally
accept the standard "termination without cause" clauses, 9 which allow
either party to terminate the contract with some specified time of notice for any or no reason at all.1° Before managed care dominance,
physicians were happy to sign contracts with such clauses;" however
these clauses now put all the power in the hands of the MCO12 beMCO's predicted cost level. Id. n.42 (citing DeselectionPredilection,MED. STAFF & PnYSICLAN ORG. ADvisoR, Mar. 1994, at 1).
8 Deselection is that process where providers have their contracts with MCOs
terminated under the termination without cause clauses of their contracts. Terminations are generally not related to quality of care issues, but instead are focused on
economic conditions and business exigencies. Note that although deselection affects
physicians and hospitals, physicians are more greatly impacted since deselection of
hospitals is less frequent. PhysiciansHurt by Termination Clauses as Managed CarePenetrationBuilds, MANAGED CARE WK.,Dec. 11, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 12838181. It is
also interesting to note that the trend of MCOs contracting with physicians is not only
to include termination without cause clauses but to expand reasons for termination
with cause. This may be problematic for providers. For example, as in the Harper
contract, infra note 34, the MCO can deselect for cause if there is any revocation or
suspension of hospital privileges. But traditional suspension of hospital privileges is
not only on the basis of quality of care problems, but is often a result of minor transgressions such as not exactly adhering to the medical records standards of the hospital which then results in a short suspension. Further, "discrimination against plan
enrollees" and other such clauses, also in Harper's contract, infra note 34, are also
problematic. These clauses may prevent physicians from severing relationships between themselves and disruptive or abusive patients of the MCO. See PhysiciansHurt by
Termination Clauses as Managed Care PenetrationBuilds, supra. This limitation assists
neither party in obtaining the goal of improving and maintaining patient health.
9 Physicians "sign[] a standard contract allowing [the managed care company]
to terminate [physicians] without cause." Terry, supra note 6, at 138.
10 "Nearly all HMOs and PPOs can abruptly fire, or 'deselect,' doctors without
explanation." Amos, supranote 1, at 10; "Realize... that you [as a physician] may be
let go from a managed care plan simply because they have too many doctors-or for
no reason at all." Howard Larkin, You're Fired;Physician Termination, AM. MED. NEWS,
Feb. 13, 1995, at 17.
11 While physicians used to embrace "termination without cause" clauses in managed care contracts, they are now finding that such clauses are being used to their
disadvantage. These clauses generally allow either the plan or providers to bow
out of a managed care agreement for no reason, with anywhere from 30 to 90
days notice.
PhysiciansHurt by Termination Clauses as Managed CarePenetrationBuilds, supra note 8,
at 1.
12 "'The ... power is with the insurance company. They're holding the purse
strings."' Amos, supra note 1, at 10 (quoting Dr. Octavio Chirino, president of the
Metropolitan St. Louis Medical Society).
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cause it is unlikely that physicians, in the current health care climate,
would terminate their primary access to patients, and thus their financial lifeline, by severing their relationship with the MCO. 13 Indeed,
physicians will forego broad discretion in clinical decisionmaking and
provide MCO-defined appropriate levels of care through the use of
MCO-chosen clinical practice guidelines, 1 4 as well as accept limitations on their care decisions (all on the basis of MCO cost) so as to
preserve their patient base.' 5 The practical implication of this shift is
13 "HMO penetration is so high in many markets, physicians can't leave their
plan because MDs need the income the plan's contract provides. This is reflected by
the explosion of lawsuits brought by doctors for allegedly improper deselection." Id.;
see also Bryan A. Liang, Expensive Courseof Treatment: Managed Care OrganizationsShould
Bear a Burden for Malpractice,LA. DAILY J., Apr. 15, 1996, at 6:
Because of their market penetration, managed care organizations generally
contract with physicians using "without cause"clauses, which reserve the organization's right to terminate its contract with the physician for any cause
or no cause at all. Thus, managed care holds the key to patient access as well
as the power to "deselect" physicians-to exclude them from access and income altogether.... [P] hysicians simply cannot afford to be so brazen as to
disregard the dictates of care as communicated to them by their financial
lifeline [the MCO].
Id. Since most patients are within the managed care infrastructure, as one physician
put it, if more MCOs deselect him, "I'll have no patients, because there aren't any
outside the HMOs." Terry, supranote 6, at 138 (quoting Dr. Satyn Chatterjee, a general surgeon). Note, however, that even when physicians are deselected, they may be
under continuing obligation to serve patients they have been treating due to state
abandonment laws. Id. (quoting attorney Alice Gosfield).
14 Clinical practice guidelines are systematically developed guides to practice for
particular clinical situations. Deborah W. Hong & Bryan A. Liang, The Scope of Clinical
PracticeGuidelines, Hosp. PHYSICIAN, May 1996, at 46. However, clinical practice guidelines as an absolute standard of care are weak. First, clinical guidelines reflect only
one perspective as to the medically appropriate action in a specific clinical scenario.
However, there may be significant variation as to medical practice that does not reflect inappropriate care. Bryan A. Liang, MedicalMalpractice:Do PhysiciansHave Knowledge of Legal Standards and Assess Cases as Juries Do? 3 U. CHI. L. ScH. ROUNDTABLE 59
(1996). Second, clinical practice guidelines are not all developed using rigorous,
double blind studies; informal consensus, formal consensus, and other approaches
are used. Hong & Liang, supra, at 46-47. In addition, guidelines may be biased due to
the source that guidelines emanate from (e.g., a medical specialty society, academic
medical center, HMO, etc.). Id. at 46, 48-49. Finally, clinical practice guidelines are
not simply evidence-based, scientific pronouncements that leave little room for debate. These guidelines reflect the value judgments of those who participated in their
formulation, including physicians, patients, and others with their own agendas. Id. at
49.
15 MCOs within the business context must contract with providers "who are both
willing and able to abide by a particular MCO's practice protocols and other economically-oriented credentialing and performances standards.... Indeed, economic security in an MCO-dominated environment will depend on the physician's ability to
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that physicians, to maintain their contract with the MCO, their access
to patients, and thus their remuneration, must be low cost. This focus
on cost encompasses not only the care provided to MCO enrollees;
16
physicians must also follow administrative requirements of the plan,
and, importantly, minimize hassles to the MCO in other, non-delivery
aspects of care such as appealing patient care denials, requesting experimental treatments, and informing patients about treatments that
may be beneficial to them but which are not covered by the plan. 17
meet and abide by the MCO's economic credentialing criteria." Stephen E. Ronai,
Managed-CareCredentialing:Limited Access and Limited Rights, CONN.L. TaiB., Sept. 18,
1995 (Supplement, Health Law), at S12. Selection, however, comes at a cost: "[o]nce
selected, [physicians] will have a limited ability to contest a termination pursuant to
severely circumscribed procedural rights," i.e., there will be limited due process if and
when deselection occurs. Id.
16 [S]ince MCOs can reduce program costs only by controlling utilization, they
are constrained to reappoint only those providers who adhere to the MCO's economic credentialing rules of the road ....
[Thus, for providers who do not
follow these rules,] [t]he MCO must then make a credentialing decision to drop
such uncooperative or inefficient providers without regard to their clinical
competence.
17 Thus, a physician will avoid being a "problematic" provider who "mak[es]
trouble for the managed care organization" since these types of providers can be considered to be cost centers and be eliminated through deselection. Liang, supra note
13. In fact, "'[t]here is an implied power that such [termination without cause
clause] contracts have on physicians. They're afraid to speak up because they know
they can be arbitrarily deselected.- Janice Somerville, Decision Gives Does New Recourse
on HMO Firings,AM. MED. NEws, May 6, 1996, at 10 (quoting Richard B. Friedman,
immediate past president of the New Hampshire Medical Society). When doctors do
insist on particular types of care for their patients, they can be deselected. See Terry,
supra note 6, at 138 (recounting experience of physician who requested inpatient
hospital admissions for two patients with gestational diabetes which were initially denied by HMO but approved after appeal; one week after the second episode, physician was sent a termination without cause letter deselecting her from the plan).
Physicians in particular specialties and nonphysicians may be especially vulnerable.
For example, for inpatient psychiatry, pre-admission screening may require the therapist to provide highly personal, sensitive, and detailed case histories of the patient
before approval. Providers, fearful of being deselected, may not object to this potential violation of the patient-physician confidentiality relationship. Leigh Page, Managed CareHasPsychiatristsin High Anxiety, AM. MED. NEws, Mar. 6, 1996, at 3. Overall:
[i]f it is easier for the [MCO] to hire a certain kind of doctor-one who is
cost efficient, to be sure, but also one who is compliant, in agreement with
[the MCO's] methods-then that is what [the MCO] is going to do. And if
there comes a time when there are more doctors than necessary on a single
plan in a given part of town or too many specialists on a given plan, the
[MCO] will simply lay some of them off. The [MCO]'s only obligation is to
provide a doctor, not a particular doctor. Skill is irrelevant.
Mimi Swartz, Not What the Doctor Ordered, TEx. MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at 86.
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The shift in the decisionmaking and practice structure under managed care has thus significantly altered the role of the physician. 18
Many physicians have been deselected under a termination without cause clause; the few who have challenged these terminations
have generally been denied relief.' 9 In fact, the fight is usually for
some form of due process before termination rather than questioning
the right to terminate itself.20 Although the latter has generated some
interesting legislation21 and case law,22 there have been no indications
18 [Tlhe Norman Rockwell vision of medicine, where the physician had sole discretion over the care the patient receives and the economy has enough money to
fund this care, has gone the way of the dinosaur.... [Now,] the physician may be
able to indicate what care can be given; the managed care organization indicates
what care in fact will be given.
Liang, supra note 13, at 6.
19 See infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text. Note also that termination which
affects clinical and medical staff privileges must be reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). The NPDB, 45 C.F.R. §§ 60.1-60.14 (1994), was created
under the authority of the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11101-152 (1994) for the purpose of ensuring that unethical or incompetent practitioners are restricted from moving from state to state to avoid discovery of
previous poor quality care. The NPDB is a repository of records on all payments for
malpractice claims in the United States; it also catalogues information on adverse
actions taken against a health practitioner's license, privileges, or professional society
memberships. Bryan A. Liang, Beyond the MalpracticeSuit: The NationalPractitionerData
Bank, Hosp. PH'SiLcN,July 1995, at 11. Thus deselection can mandate a report to the
NPDB.
20 The general rule is that "[ii]fyou're in a managed care plan, there's usually less
you can do to protect yourself in the event of termination. Most have no provisions
for peer review and you may not even get an administrative review." Larkin, supra
note 10, at 17.
21 Note that under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11101-152, physicians in managed care who are excluded, deselected, or terminated are afforded due process rights if the action was on the basis of professional
conduct or quality of care grounds. However, this is quite inapplicable for deselection in the general circumstance of termination due to economic criteria under a
without cause clause. Deselection is more akin to termination under an exclusive
contract with a termination without cause clause, which does not generally invoke
notice and hearing (i.e., due process) requirements. Bryan A. Liang, An Overview and
Analysis of MedicalExclusive Contracts,J. LEGAL MED. (forthcoming Mar. 1997) (manuscript at nn.85-147 and accompanying text, on file with author). However, California
and Connecticut have statutory provisions that provide for mandatory notice and due
process for deselected physicians. See Larkin, supra note 10, at 17; Brian McCormick,
Patients,Doctors Sue CIGNA in Deselection Flap, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 26, 1994, at 3.
22 The case that has become known for the proposition that providers are entitled to "due process" is DeltaDental Plan of Cal. v. Banasky, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381 (Ct.
App. 1994). In DeltaDental, the court held that a dispute regarding fees was contractually to be addressed in the plan resolution procedure but was subject to judicial
review because of the dentists' common law right to fair procedure: "[because the
dentists are entitled to fair procedure, they have the right to seek judicial re-
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that termination without cause clauses are anything but valid, or that
good faith or public policy considerations are required when exercising these clauses in health care contracts. 23 Thus, although terminations under these clauses may require some form of due process, the
exercise of and terminations under them have been considered
24

valid.

Until now. 25 The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Harper v.
Healthsourc2 6 held that

[i]f a physician's relationship ...is terminated without cause and
the physician believes that the decision to terminate was, in truth,
made in bad faith or based upon some factor that would render the
decision contrary to public policy, then the physician is entitled to
review of the decision.

27

The court thus provided a singular holding regarding deselection
in health care under a termination without cause clause contract that
aside from due process considerations, the decision for termination
view . .. after exhausting the administrative remedy." Id. at 384. This right to fair
procedure, however, appears limited to members of organizations that "control important economic interests" of the members. Id. at 385 (quoting Applebaum v. Board
of Dirs., 656, 163 Cal. Rptr. 831 (Ct. App. 1980)). It is important to note that the
court did not indicate that MCO internal procedures were not to be used; the court
rejected the dentists' claim that because the internal review was done by the organization itself, it is biased: "[d] espite the availability of mandamus review, the dentists still
contend Delta's internal review procedure is infirm because Delta lacks the disinterestedness and impartiality necessary to act in ajudicial or quasi-judicial capacity. This
argument is unavailing." Delta Denta4 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 386. Note also that the judicial review can only be sought under a writ of mandate; this limits the plaintiffs' remedy (e.g., no damages) and the court only reviews whether the hearing was fair and
whether evidence supported the decision. JulieJohnsson, DoctorsEntitled to Due Process
in HMO Disputes,AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 21, 1994, at 1. Finally, even though there may
be some due process rights for providers, this case did not involve a termination without cause clause and thus its applicability may be limited.
23 See Liang, supra note 21 and infra notes 280-92 and accompanying text.
24 However, the termination cannot be in violation of that provider's civil rights.
SeeAmbrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 899 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1995), infra notes
53-61 and accompanying text.
25 "This is the first state Supreme Court ruling of its kind." Doctor Sues HMO for
DroppingHim as a 'PreferredProvider,'LAw. WELY.USA, May 6, 1996, at 9; "[T]he AMA
is celebrating a New Hampshire Supreme Court decision that gives physicians legal
recourse when HMOs terminate their contracts without cause. The unanimous decision, a first, provides legal ammunition for cases in other states ...... Somerville,
supra note 17, at 10; "The case [is] the first of its kind to be heard by a state supreme
court ....
" Ralph Jimenez, Court to Hear Insurers on Right to Drop MDs, BOSTON
SUNDAY GLOBE, Jan. 28, 1996, at 1.
26 Harper v. Healthsource N.H., Inc., 674 A.2d 962 (N.H. 1996).
27 Id. at 966.
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itself is reviewable under a good faith and public policy basis, and not
simply the procedureby which it is accomplished.
This Article will briefly review the facts of this remarkable case in
Part II and then turn to an overview of deselection in Part III. In Part
IV an analysis of the legal reasoning of the court is provided, which
will show that on the basis of general common law, jurisdictionally
relevant law, and the court's own citations and discussion, Harper
(and the court) simply cannot justify a traditional cause of action.
However, in Part V, on the basis of the court's correct recognition of
the new role of the physician under managed care, a health policy is
proposed that would protect vulnerable patients-those currently at
highest risk for injury in this new social health delivery framework.
The Article concludes in Part VI.
II.

HAR ER V. HALTz, YOURCE

THE FACTS

PaulJ. Harper, M.D. (Harper) is a board-certified surgeon who is
licensed to practice medicine in New Hampshire.2 8 He has contracted and periodically renewed his relationship with Healthsource
New Hampshire, Inc.2 9 (Healthsource) as a participating physician.

He provided both surgical and primary care services to Healthsource
enrollees from 1985 to 1989. However, in 1989, although Healthsource continued to contract with Harper as a primary care provider,
it did not contract for his surgical services.3 0 According to the records
examined by the court, thirty to forty percent of Harper's patient base
3
came from Healthsource. '
However, Harper claimed that in June 1994, Healthsource began
to "manipulat[e] and skew[ ] the records of treatment he had provided to several of his patients and that such inaccuracies adversely
affected. other subsequent reports."3 2 Harper apparently notified
Healthsource of these claimed inaccuracies in patient records. In response, Healthsource indicated to Harper that the credentialing committee had reviewed his patient records and had not found any quality
of care problem; however, at the same time, it informed Harper that
the credentialing committee was recommending that his contract be
28 The facts as stated here are those assumed by the court in id. at 963-64.
29 The HMO is the state's largest, with approximately 122,000 enrollees. Somerville, supra note 17, at 10.

30 Harper,674 A.2d at 963.
31 Id. This would most likely entitle Harper to "common law due process" rights.
See Delta Dental Health Plan of Cal. v. Banasky, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381 (Ct. App. 1994).
32

Harper,674 A.2d at 963 (quoting Harper's writ to the court).
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terminated because he had not satisfied Healthsource's recredential33
ing criteria.
Harper then appealed the credentialing committee's recommendation to the clinical quality assurance committee and requested the
documentation on which the credentialing committee made its determinations. The materials were not forthcoming. However, although
Healthsource refused to provide the documents, it advised Harper
that he could present evidence to counter the Healthsource evidence
at the clinical quality assurance committee hearing. Subsequently,
Harper did not attend or participate in the subsequent clinical quality
assurance meeting due to Healthsource's refusal to provide the documentation. Without Harper present, the clinical quality assurance
committee affirmed the credentialing committee's decision and recommendation to terminate Harper for cause, but added that Harper
34
should be terminated without cause as well.
33 Id. A Healthsource spokeswomen indicated that this occasion was the first
time Healthsource had ever canceled a physician contract. Somerville, supranote 17,
at 10.
34 Harper,674 A.2d at 963. The relevant provisions of Harper's contract are as
follows:
2.02. Termination Without Cause. This Agreement may be terminated by
either party without cause upon six (6) months prior written notice.
2.03. Termination With Cause. This Agreement may be terminated immediately by [Healthsource] at any time with cause upon written notice of
cause to [Harper].
Cause shall include, but not be limited to:
(i) repeated failure to comply with quality assurance, peer review and
utilization review procedure;
(ii) unprofessional conduct as determined by the appropriate state professional licensing agency;
(iii) conviction for any criminal offense related to the practice of
medicine or any felony unrelated to such practice;
(iv) failure to meet Credentialing Committee standards and
procedures;
(v) revocation, reduction, or suspension of privileges at any participating provider hospital or any hospital where [Harper] conducts his principal
practice;
(vi) failure by [Harper] to meet the "Conditions of Participation" specified in Section 3;
(vii) interference by [Harper] with [Healthsource]'s employer relations and business contracts;
(viii) discrimination against [Healthsource] Members as described in
Section 4.03; or
(ix) repeated failure of [Harper] to comply with the terms of this
Agreement.
Id. at 964.
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Harper appealed again, this time to the Executive Management
Committee. The Executive Management Committee held a hearing
at which Harper was present. Healthsource did not present any evidence at this hearing and it continued to refuse Harper access to the
evidence which supported Healthsource's decision to terminate him.
The Executive Management Committee voted to uphold the clinical
quality assurance committee's decision to terminate Harper without
cause, but did not terminate Harper with cause. This last hearing exhausted Harper's internal administrative appeals. 3 5
Harper then filed a suit in equity with the New Hampshire Superior Court; Healthsource moved to dismiss all of Harper's causes of
action. The superior court granted the motion. Harper then appealed this grant in four areas:
(1) that the 'termination without cause' provision in the agreement,
or the termination in this case, is void against public policy; (2) that
Healthsource was a state actor required to afford him equal protection and due process; (3) that he properly pleaded a cause of action
for civil conspiracy; and (4) that Healthsource violated3 6RSA 420B:26, II in refusing to provide him with certain records.
The supreme court dismissed all but his termination without
cause claim due to potential bad faith and violation of public policy; it
37
then remanded the case.
III.

HEALTH CARE DESELECTION

Few deselection cases have been published. Generally, it would
appear that the termination without cause clauses appear to deter
providers from challenging such terminations.3 8
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 The court terminated without prejudice Harper's damages claim against
Healthsource for not providing him with the records he requested since it related to a
privilege claim which may be relevant to the case on remand. The court affirmed the
trial court's decision to dismiss both the state actor claim as well as the civil conspiracy
claim. Id. at 967-68.

38

Many physicians have been reported to be deselected but there have been no

successful published challenges to these terminations except under antidiscrimina-

ion laws (see Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal.
1995); infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text). See, e.g., Select PreferredProviderPlan

of Blue Cross Blue Shield of the National CapitalArea: Before the Compensation and Employee
Benefits Subcomm. of the House Post Office and Civil Service Comm., 103d Cong. (1994)
(statement of Rodney Ellis, M.D., Vice-President, Medical Society of the District of
Columbia) (indicating that a Blue Cross plan "'deselected' almost 4,000 doctors who

were previously included in the regular [Blue Cross] indemnity program"); Julie
Johnsson, HospitalMedical Staffs: Next Managed Care Casualty2,AM. MED.NEWS, Oct. 17,
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Further, in some circumstances the merits of a deselection challenge have not been reached when denying provider relief. For example, in Texas a group of providers had a termination without cause
clause in their PPO agreement with an insurance company. These
providers were subsequently deselected; they then sought to have
these clauses deemed void and unenforceable because, they claimed,
the clauses violated the Texas statutes regulating PPOs which require
PPO contracts to be based solely on economic, quality, and accessibility considerations, and because the physicians were not provided due
process upon termination. 39 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment for the insurance company because the state statutes did not provide for private causes of action for
enforcement of the PPO rules. 40 Thus, without reaching the merits of
deselection under termination without cause clauses, the court held
41
that the physicians had no cause of action and dismissed their suit.
However, one court has held that the preemptive effects of ERISA
may not be used to dismiss a challenge to physician deselection. In
Hollis v. CIGNA Healthcare of Connecticut,42 physicians and patients
brought suit against CIGNA after the physicians were deselected from
the provider panel. The patients claimed that CIGNA misrepresented
the nature of specific provider access in their advertisements in violation of the state's unfair insurance statute; that these advertisements

were unfair or deceptive in violation of the state's unfair trade practices statute; that the removal of specific physicians who were listed as
providers with the state without informing the physicians as to the criteria the physicians failed to meet was in violation of the state's man1994, at 1 (reporting that there has been a large increase in deselected physicians in
the past year on medical staffs); Terry, supra note 6, at 138 ("Thousands of doctors
have been 'deselected'-or denied participation in the first place.")
39 Texas Med. Ass'n v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 153 (5th Cir. 1996).
40 Id. at 160. Note that in another Texas Medical Association case, Texas Med.
Ass'n v. Prudentia4No. 93-65003 (80th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex., Dec. 22, 1993)
(removed to federal court, Dec. 29, 1993), physicians claimed that under the Texas
Administrative Code, they were entitled to due process rights before deselection and
an opportunity to present evidence and refute Prudential's evidence. Prudential indicated that their decision to deselect the providers was "business judgment" and
deselection occurred under the termination without cause clause. Larry A. "Max"
Maxwell, HealthcareLaw, 48 SMU L. REv. 1303, 1323 (1995). However, this suit was
dropped in 1996. See infra note 41.
41 According to a Texas Medical Association representative, the Association has
dropped its suit against Prudential, see Maxwell, supra note 40, and has not filed an
appeal in the Aetna case (personal communication, June 12, 1996).
42 Nos. 705357, 705358, 1994 WL 757530 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 5, 1994), rev'd
sub nom. Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Conn., Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 19916.
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aged care statute; and that CIGNA had perpetrated the common law
tort of misrepresentation on -them. The physicians brought claims of
common law breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with business expectancies, and violation of the state's unfair trade practice and managed
care statutes. 43
The trial court granted CIGNA's motion to strike all claims of all
plaintiffs. 44 The trial court based its decision on the preemptive effects of ERISA on the state laws. 45 The court indicated first that the
CIGNA health plan was an employee benefit plan under the auspices
of ERISA; as such, the court noted that the patients' cause of action
clearly "relate [d] to" 46 the plan because the plaintiffs "challenge the
administration of the plan in question. . . . The complaint
here . . .focuses on CIGNA's removal of certain physicians from its

plan. This is, in essence, a complaint about plan administration. This
47
is a core ERISA concern."
However, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed. 48 The
Supreme Court indicated that, indeed, the critical issue was "whether
the plaintiffs' claims 'relate to' the employee benefit plan offered by
CIGNA." 49 But, the court disagreed with the trial court's analysis of
the issue and concluded that the claims did not "relate to" the plan
because they did "not attempt to prescribe the substantive administrative aspects of a plan, such as a determination of an employee's eligibility, the nature and amount of employee benefits, the amount of an
employer's contribution to a plan, and the rules and regulations
under which the plan operates."50 Instead, the court held that the
plaintiffs' claims, "merely [sought] to enforce the plan that CIGNA
ha[d] chosen to create and administer." 5 1 Thus, the court reversed
43 Id. at *2.
44 Id. at *10.
45 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). ERISA
pre-empts an extremely broad array of state statutory and common law claims which
significantly affects state efforts at health care reform. See generally Devon P. Groves,
EPJSA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 609 (1995);
Nicole Weisenborn, ERISA Preemption and Its Effect on State Health Reform, 5 KAN.J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 147 (1995); Jolee Ann Hancock, Comment, DiseasedFederalism: State Health
CareLaws Fall Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 CUMB. L. REv. 383 (1994-1995).
46 Hollis, 1994 WL 757530, at *6-*7.
47 Id. at *7.
48 Napoletano v. CIGNA Healthcare of Conn., Inc., 680 A.2d 127 (Conn. 1996).
49 Id. at 138.
50 Id. at 142.
51 Id. at 136.

1997]

DESELECTION

AND

PATIENT-PHYSICIAN

RELATIONSHIPS

811

the trial court's dismissal and remanded the case for trial on the
52
merits.
The sole published case involving a termination without cause
clause that resulted in judgment for the plaintiff is Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,53 where the court held that a podiatrist's termination as a provider under his contract with the insurance
company violated California's anti-discrimination statute. The provider had been addicted to narcotics; this past chemical addiction was
considered by the court as a "disability" on the basis of the definition
imported from the Americans with Disabilities Act 54 Termination of
the provider was discriminatory under the statute because the insurance company did not show "why either a drug-free history or a nonprobationary status [of the provider's license to practice] is an essential qualification ....

[U]se of...

generalizations about a class of

disabled persons instead of evaluating the actual qualification of a disabled individual is a prohibited form of discrimination on the basis of
disability."55 Hence, termination even under a without cause clause on
the basis of "race, creed, religion, color, national origin, sex, or disability of the person" was held to violate the statute and thus be
56
prohibited.
The court also found that the podiatrist
had a common law right to fair procedures, including the right not
to be expelled from membership for reasons which are arbitrary,
capricious and/or contrary to public policy.... For the same reasons that [Ambrosino's] termination is discriminatory as a matter of
law, it is also arbitrary
and capricious and violative of public policy
57
as a matter of law.
Substantively, since Metropolitan Life
applied the at-will termination provision of its participating physician agreement... in a discriminatory manner, thereby breaching
[the California anti-discrimination statute] in that [Ambrosino's]
disability, a former chemical dependency, was a cause of [his] termination from participation in [Metropolitan Life's] network, and
[since Metropolitan Life] did not show freedom from the disability
to be an essential qualification of participation,
52
53
54
55

Id. at 146.
899 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
Ambrosino, 899 F. Supp. at 444.

56 Id. at 442 (citing CAL. CfV.

57 Id. at 445.

CODE

§ 51.5).
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Metropolitan Life violated Ambrosino's civil lights when it deselected
him from the plan. 58
This result is not surprising. Although there was a termination
without cause clause within the contractual agreement itself, parties
cannot contract around, and one party cannot discriminate on the
basis of prohibited criteria within, civil rights statutes. 59 Thus, for example, if Metropolitan Life had terminated Ambrosino because he
was Asian, or Catholic, or female, the court would have held that Metropolitan Life was discriminatory in its termination and that the termination was arbitrary, capricious, and violated public policy. 60
However, apart from circumstances which invoke civil rights or constitutional provisions, it would appear that deselection under a termination without cause clause is a legally viable business method to
maintain a sound economic basis of an MCO. 61
IV.

HARPER V.HEALTHSOURcm. ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION

The New Hampshire Supreme Court began its analysis of
Harper's contract with the recognition that the contract between
Harper and Healthsource was one with a termination without cause
clause: "Harper contends that we should strike the provision in his
agreement with Healthsource allowing Healthsource to terminate the
relationship without cause as being against public policy." 62 Their relationship thus appears to rest more upon contract rather than a traditional hire and fire employer-employee relationship. 63 However, the
58 Id. at 446. The case is currently on appeal for costs and attorney's fees; the
appeal was filed on May 22, 1996.
59 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50 (1974) ("[W]e think it
clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title
VII."); Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.W.2d 186, 189-90 (N.D. 1989) ("We conclude
that a contract cannot excuse later unlawful discrimination .... Intrinsically, a law
against discrimination outlaws contradictory contracts."); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS: BASES OF PUBLIC POLICIES AGAINST ENFORCEMENT § 179 (1981)
("A public policy against the enforcement of promises or other terms may be derived
by the court from ... legislation relevant to such a policy .
).

60 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
61 Decisions to terminate providers under deselection are very analogous to similar decisions under exclusive contract arrangements. Both involve contracts with terminations without cause clauses and both are not considered to impugn the quality
reputation of the provider. Exclusive contracts and terminations thereunder are seen
to be based on economic criteria and thus to reflect "medical businessjudgment." As
such, they are held in "great deference" by the courts. Liang, supra note 21, at
nn.173-76 and accompanying text.
62 Harper,674 A.2d at 964.
63

See infra note 267.
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court continued its substantive discussion of the case by reviewing the
law of employment relationships. This emphasis upon employer-employee law is a recurrent theme throughout the opinion and,
although there are concerns regarding this emphasis, this section will
take the lead of the court and begin the discussion with an analysis of
the law in this area.
A.

Employer-Employee Relationships

Employment at will relationships under the traditional common
law rule can be terminated under virtually any condition, good, bad,
or ugly.64 However, this rigid rule has become softened over the past
several decades and currently some exceptions have been carved out
of this legal doctrine. These generally fall under conceptions of a
breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing, public policy concerns, and implied-in-fact contracts.
1. Implied-in-Fact Contracts
To dispense with the latter first, implied-in-fact contracts as applied to the at will employment relationship allow the traditional at
will employee to maintain a breach of contract action when some act
by the employer has made the employee reasonably believe that his or
her employment tenure will continue or that the employer has promised some set of actions that will occur before the employee is terninated. 65 The classic circumstance where this arises is through
modification of an employment at will relationship. In PineRiver State
64 See, e.g., NLRB v. McGahey, 233 F.2d 406, 413 (5th Cir. 1956) (stating that
termination of an at will agreement may be for "good cause, or bad cause, or no cause
at all"); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Ariz. 1985)
(Termination can be "'for no cause, or even for a cause morally wrong.' (using language from Payne v. Western & Ad. R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-20 (1884), rev'd sub nom.
on other ground, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915))); Fawcett v. G.C. Murphy & Co., 348 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ohio 1976) (holding that an employer's right to
discharge is absolute and not limited by considerations and principles that protect
individuals from gross or reckless conduct, willful, wanton or malicious acts, or acts
done intentionally, with insult, or in bad faith); Payne v. Western & Ad. ,.R., 81 Tenn.
507, 518-20 (1884), reu'd sub nom. on other ground, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134
(Tenn. 1915) (holding that termination of employment at will contracts can be "for
good cause, for no cause, or even for cause morally wrong"); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 130, at 1027 (5th ed. 1984) (pointing out
that termination can be "even for reasons of spite or malice").
65 Essentially, the at will nature of an employment relationship is rebuttable if the
employer and employee take particular action. See Minihan v. American Pharm.
Ass'n, 812 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (indicating that employment at will doctrine is a
rebuttable presumption).
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Bank v. Mettille,6 6 procedural restraints on termination of employees
added to an employee handbook were held to have formed an implied-in-fact contract between the at will employee and employer and
was binding as a promise on the employer. In traditional contract
terms, the added provisions in the employee handbook were the offer;
"[t]he employee's retention of employment constitute[d] acceptance . .. ; [and] by continuing to stay on the job, although free to
leave, the employee supplie[d] the necessary consideration .... -67
The requisite components for an implied-in-law modification of an at
will relationship thus appear to be some promise by the employer related to employment, 68 consideration given by the employee, an employee acceptance, and a breach of that promise through
69
inappropriate termination.
It does not appear that Harper as a contracting physician falls
within this rubric of legal fiction. 70 According to the facts as laid out
by the court, there were no outward manifestations or promises that
his tenure with Healthsource would be subject to any additional terms
66 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
67 Id. at 627. However, note that this "continuing to stay on the job" conception
of legal consideration is a double-edge sword. See Lee v. Sperry Corp., 678 F. Supp.
1415 (D. Minn. 1987) (granting summary judgment for employer when postemployment amendment to employee manual which transformed employment relationship
into one terminable at will was considered accepted by employee's continuation of
work).
68 Note also that employees can obtain success if the court believes that there can
be reasonable reliance upon these promises; see Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685
P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (holding that employees who justifiably rely on expressed
policies in employment manuals make these policies binding upon the employer and
the employer cannot treat these policies as illusory promises).
69 Certainly one can argue that Mettille, by simply staying on the job, was doing
what he was otherwise obligated to do. If that is the case, then the legal duty rule
would dictate that Mettille furnished no additional consideration for the "contract."
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS: PERFORMANCE OF LEGAL DUTY § 73 (1981).
Indeed, instead of "protecting" the employee, the court's holding that such employee
handbook provisions, which have a doubtful audience to begin with, constitute a potential modification of the contractual relationship may in fact harm the employee
through a subsequent employer policy of disclosing nothing and keeping their employees in the dark so as to avoid potential court reckoning in the future.
Further, implied-in-fact promises can be considered weaker than any express
promises, to the point where a court might conclude that the implied-in-fact promise
cannot be used to successfully support an employee's wrongful dismissal. See Broussard v. CACI, Inc.-Federal, 780 F.2d 162 (Ist Cir. 1986) (holding that express
promises regarding employment security are distinguishable from implied promises
from employee handbooks and negotiations, with implied promises insufficient to
sustain a wrongful termination claim).
70 See supra note 69.
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past those in his written contract. Indeed, Harper himself did not
claim any such modification nor implied-in-fact duty on the basis of
any additional oral or written promise(s) between him and Healthsource. There was thus no offer, no acceptance, or any consideration
to be noted. Thus, it would appear that there is no implied-in-fact
7
contract issue here. '
Note, however, that even within a framework of implied promises
which can potentially provide for continued employment or additional rights, employers may limit their obligations to employees explicitly through various disclaimers in handbooks or on employment
applications. 72 These disclaimers are express provisions that indicate
to employees that any general actions or informal agreements by employers are not to be construed as implied agreements. For example,
in Novosel v. Sears, Robuck & Co.,73 the court held that a clause on an
employment application which expressly reserved the company's right
to terminate with or without cause effectively refuted any possible implied agreement to the contrary. 74 Similarly, in Coos v. NationalAssociation of Realtors,75 the court held that a conspicuous disclaimer in the
employment handbook barred an implied-in-fact contract claim as a
matter of law due to the lack of reasonableness of reliance on any
inferable offer therein. Hence, these disclaimers basically make any
reliance upon implied or other promises that contradict an express
disclaimer unreasonable. 76 Indeed, even a written contract for contin71 Of course, somehow the thread of law can always be found in the fabric of life.
See supra note 69. Thus, for example, if Healthsource requested Harper to change his
performance by requesting him to provide only primary care services rather than surgical services, i.e., to devote 100% of his time to primary care for Healthsource patients, this change could furnish consideration for some modification of his
relationship with Healthsource if an enterprising attorney could find an implied or
express promise on the part of Healthsource to terminate for cause only. Of course, a
simpler approach would be that which the Pine River Bank court used: simply by continuing to work, consideration was provided for any modification.
72 See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
73 495 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
74 The clause read, "In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to
the rules and regulations of Sears, Roebuck and Co., and my employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without cause, and with or without notice, at any
time, at the option of either the Company or myself." Id. at 346; see also Cutter v.
Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 794 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding a JNOV ruling
for an employer where written employment agreement provided for termination with
or without cause).
75 715 F. Supp. 2 (D.D.C. 1989).
76 See also Hogge v. Champion Lab., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1989)
(holding handbook disclaimer made reliance upon terms therein unreasonable);
Fournier v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 569 A.2d 1299 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
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uous employment under circumstances deemed "mutually agreeable"
between the employer and employee has been interpreted as to allow
the employer to unilaterally terminate the employee at will on the ba77
sis of the disclaimer.
Thus, even if Harper were to have claimed some form of implied
contractual duty on the part of Healthsource to keep him and not
deselect him, the conspicuous disclaimer represented by the express
termination without cause clause in his contract would most likely
78
have precluded his action under this theory.
2.

Public Policy Exception
a.

The General Common Law

Another major legal doctrine which has carved out an exception
to the traditional terminable at will employment doctrine is based
upon public policy. If the termination of the employee was against
some clear manifestation of public policy, 79 and the employer does
not have a requisite legitimate business interest or just cause that overrides the public policy interest,8 0 the termination can be held to be
wrongful. However, note that the background rule under this public
policy exception remains that the employment relationship is at will,
1990) (holding disclaimer on employment application precluded reasonable reliance
on later general statements in the handbook or letter offer); Castiglione v.Johns Hopkins Hosp., 517 A.2d 786 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (holding that disclaimers in employment handbooks can preclude implied-in-fact claims). However, order may be
important; thus, one court has held that oral manifestations of continued employment before the written disclaimer was issued could sustain recovery on an implied
promise for employment tenure. Ohanian v. Avis Rent a Car Sys., Inc., 779 F.2d 101
(2d Cir. 1985); see also Prout v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 772 P.2d 288 (Mont. 1989)
(holding that clear disclaimer of at will relationship allowing termination for no reason did not extend to allowing dismissal thereunder for a "false cause" when employee was dismissed for falsifying time sheets). But see Carpenter v. American
Excelsior Co., 650 F. Supp. 933 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (holding that oral assurances of

employment tenure that were given before the employment application with disclaimer
was signed could not defeat the disclaimer without further oral assurances or
promises in the handbook reinforcing the oral promise of continued employment).
77 Murray v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 591 F. Supp. 1550 (S.D. W. Va.
1984), affd, 767 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1985). Of course, if an employee actually agrees to
an at will relationship, implied actions are generally precluded. See Haas v. Montgomery Ward, 812 F.2d 1015 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that an implied contract claim was
barred because employee signed a form acknowledging that employment could be
terminated at any time).
78 See supra note 34.
79 From whatever source, including the common law or statute. See infra note 123
and accompanying text.
80 See infra note 174.
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and only if the employee can manifest some evidence that there has
been a violation of some articulable public policy will he or she have
the potential to prevail. 8 '
The varying public policies that have been implicated by this exception are numerous, but all share the underlying feature of an employer requirement or action that simply violates some statutory or
common law notion of legal morality.8 2 Thus, a litany of actions have
been considered in concert with the public policy exception.
First, several statutory frameworks are fundamental to and represent the basis of support under the public policy exception. For example, discriminatory dismissal in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, is within the exception.8 3 Discharge discrimination is also prohibited on the basis of age under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196784 and on the basis of

disability under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.85 Discharge for engaging in union activities also violates public policy under federal statu86
tory law.
Far more variable, but still somewhat cohesive, are the common
law public policy exceptions.8 7 Generally, these exceptions follow the
81 See Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980)
(indicating that plaintiff-employee has the burden of proof of unjust termination
which the employer can refute).
82 See infra notes 83-174 and accompanying text; see also Haynes v. Zoological
Soc'y of Cincinnati, 567 N.E.2d 1048, 1050 (Ohio C.P. 1990) (finding a violation of
public policy that is "deeply ingrained in community and moral values").
83 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
84 29 U.S.C. § 623 (1994). But see Yoho v. Triangle P.W.C. Inc., 336 S.E.2d 204
(W. Va. 1985) (holding that dause of collective bargaining agreement mandating termination of seniority after employee's absence from work for one year for work-related injury was not contrary to public policy, even though loss of seniority also
resulted in termination of employee).
85 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994); see also Ambrosino v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 899 F.
Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal. 1995); supra notes 5-58 and accompanying text.
86 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994).
87 These public policy cases may be brought in either contract or tort. Since I am
simply focusing on the qualitative nature of this particular action, i.e., the question of
whether the facts present any cause of action, I will not delve into the nuances of the
contract-torts distinction. To obtain a greater flavor of these distinctions, see generally Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law Theoy, 20 GA. L. REv. 323 (1986); Cheryl S. Massingale, At-Will
.ng.... 24 U. RiCH. L. REv. 187 (1990); Christopher L. PenEmployment: Going
nington, Comment, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REv. 1583 (1994); Note, ProtectingEmployees At
Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1931
(1983).
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ideal that an employee cannot be terminated for refusing to engage in
activities that violate (or for engaging in activities to thwart violations
of) the law or that prevent an employee from performing a civic duty.
The cases run the gamut. For example, the public policy exception
has extended to circumstances where an employee refused to give
false testimony,a8 refused to engage in a price fixing scheme for gasoline,8 9 insisted that the employer comply with the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act requirements, 90 reported violations of public health
and safety statutes,9 1 attempted to comply with jury duty,92 filed a
workmen's compensation claim,93 engaged in whistleblowing,9 4 and
refused to take a polygraph test which would violate a state statute.9 5
88 Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959).
89 Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980).
90 Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980); Boyle v. Vista
Eyewear, 700 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). But note that there may be some
distinction as to employees who are responsible for reporting such actions of an employer versus reporters who do not have such responsibility and are terminated. See
Smith v. Calgon Carbon Corp., 917 F.2d 1338 (3d Cir. 1990) (reversing verdict of
$400,000 for an employee who had been terminated after reporting water pollution
activities).
91 Skillsky v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing summary
judgment for employer who terminated employee for filing a complaint with the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration). Note that the Occupational
Health and Safety Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1) (1994), provides protection against employers who fire employees on the basis of reporting violations of the Act. In addition, the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (1994), and the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1994), provide statutory protection against
termination for reporting violations of its dictates.
92 Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); see also
Juror Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (1994) (allowing for recovery of compensatory
and punitive damages by an employee who is dismissed or threatened to be dismissed
for jury service).
93 Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 568 N.E.2d 520 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Smith v.
Smithway Motor Xpress, 464 N.W.2d 682 (Iowa 1991); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245
N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976); Hopkins v. Tip Top Plumbing & Heating Co., 805
S.W.2d 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). However, note that there are cases which do not
allow a cause of action for challenging termination after filing a workmen's compensation claim. See, e.g., Smith v. Gould, Inc., 918 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1990); Kelly v.
Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981).
94 Palmer v. Brown, 752 P.2d 685, 689 (Kan. 1988) ("Public policy requires that
citizens in a democracy be protected from reprisals for performing their civil duty of
reporting infractions of rules, regulations, or the law ....");see also 10 U.S.C. § 2409
(1994), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-51m (West 1987 & Supp. 1996), ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 26, §§ 831-40 (West 1964), and MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.361-369 (West
1994) as examples of statutes which protect whistleblowers.
95 Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Wilcox v.
Hy-Vee Food Stores, 458 N.W.2d 870 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Note, however, that not
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Other egregious behavior within the public policy exception beyond
actions by employers in retaliation for an employee's refusal to violate
(or actions to report employer violations of) the law include actions
that, although potentially couchable in legal terms, simply offend the
sensibilities of social and professional norms. For example, public
policy exceptions to the at will rule include the case of Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 9 6 where an employee was fired due to her rejection of a
97
foreman's sexual advances towards her, and O'Sullivan v. Mallon,
where a radiology technician was terminated after refusing to perform
a procedure to which her license did not extend.
Applying these courts' considered ideals to the Harper circumstance, it appears difficult to reconcile the nature of the HarperHealthsource relationship and Harper's subsequent termination with
any identifiable public policy exception in the employment context.
For example, there has been no discrimination in violation of civil
rights statutes, no union activities of note, no retaliatory actions
against Harper on the basis of his participating in jury or other civic
duties, no retaliatory action against Harper related to non-performance or reporting of illegal acts, and no retaliation against him for
filing a worker's compensation claim. There have been no allegations
of sexual impropriety, nor has Healthsource asked, and Harper refused, to perform some action outside the scope of his abilities or duties. There simply appears to be no cognizable or directly applicable
circumstance that would immediately call one's attention to a public
policy exception that the court so readily applied when considering
Harper's termination. And importantly, no source of public policy
was identified expressly by the court or Harper.
b.

The Jurisdictionally Relevant Common Law

Indeed, in addition to the hornbook common law on the subject
which does not seem to bolster Harper's arguments or the court's
contentions, the cases the court itself cites appear to have limited applicability and usefulness in support of the purported public policy
exception. New Hampshire has engaged in much of the development
of exceptions to the traditional rule in employee termination cases.
Thus, the court first pronounces this role, indicating that it has
all courts follow this rule; see Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1977) (indicating that no cause of action is sustainable for employee's refusal to take
polygraph test and subsequent termination).
96 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
97 390 A.2d 149 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978) (involving a catherization
procedure).
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"carved out exceptions to the common law employment-at-will doctrine."98 The court then cites Monge99 simply for the proposition that
there must be a balance between "the employer's interest in running
his business ...against the interest of the employee in maintaining his
employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two."' ° However, the court also cites Cloutier v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,' 0 1 but only for the proposition that
common law employment relationships are generally considered to be
at will.102 But Cloutieris the court's most recent conception of the law
to be applied in analyzing and deciding if exceptions to the at will
doctrine apply to a particular employee termination. It is thus instructive to review the case to elucidate the jurisdictionally required standard to be applied in Harper.
First, with regard to this standard of application, the Cloutiercourt
emphasized a major limitation of Monge,10 3 not noted by the Harper
court, by reviewing Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 10 4 where the court confined the holding in Monge to circumstances "'where an employee is
discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would condemn...... "'105 Thus, the Cloutier court noted, "'unless an employee
at will identifies a specific expression of public policy, he may be discharged with or without cause."'" 06 On the basis of Monge and Howard,
the court then fashioned a two-part test that a plaintiff must fulfill in
order to maintain an action for wrongful termination under the public policy auspice:
First, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was motivated by
bad faith, malice, or retaliation in terminating the plaintiffs employment.... Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was
discharged because he performed an act that public policy would
encourage, or refused to do something that public policy would
107
condemn.
98
99

Harper,674 A.2d at 964.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.

100
101

Harper,674 A.2d at 964-65 (quoting Monge, 316 A.2d at 551).
436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981).

102

Harper,674 A.2d at 964.

103 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
104 414 A.2d 1273 (N.H. 1980).
105

Cloutier, 436 A.2d at 1143 (quoting Howard, 414 A.2d at 1274).

106 Id. (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (NJ. 1980))
(emphasis added).
107 Id. at 1143-44.
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The court then applied this new test to the facts of the case. In
Cloutie, David Cloutier was assigned to be the manager of a new A & P
store in a "dangerous" area.1 08 Cloutier, being on the managerial
staff; was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement the store
had with its other workers. The implication of this fact was that Cloutier was the only person who could use his own vehicle to conduct
employer business.1 0 9
Due to the dangerous nature of the area, Cloutier obtained permission from his employer to secure protection for company employees who made cash deposits on their way from the store to the bank.
Thus, Cloutier retained, again with his employer's permission, the
services of local police who charged $3 for each trip. 11 0 However, five
to six months later, Cloutier's employer indicated to him that the police services and payment therefor would no longer be provided.
Cloutier and the assistant manager protested this decision."1 Cloutier knew that his employees feared injury when making the deposits
and indicated to his employer that the policy was 'Jeopardizing [his]
help's lives."' 1 2 Unfortunately, his employer simply told Cloutier to
"lock up any funds for deposit in the safe located in the store if any of
the employees.., were afraid to go to the bank at night or during the
weekend";" 8 his employer did nothing else. One evening, the day
after Cloutier had completed his seventh straight day at work, he was
notified that the store had been broken into and the safe had been
burglarized." 4 When he went to investigate, he determined that
there had not been a deposit that day, and thus there had been approximately $30,000 stolen from the store; apparently, the funds had
been placed into the regular store safe rather than a "barrel safe" as
was required by company policy." 5 One month later, Cloutier was
terminated due to his "violation of company bookkeeping procedure."" 6 Cloutier filed a wrongful termination cause of action against
his employer and obtained ajury verdict in his favor." 7 His employer
appealed.
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1144. This included making store receipt deposits. See infra note 121.
Id. 1141.
Id.
Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On appeal, the court applied the two-part public policy exception
test. 118 First, the court noted that "[t] he plaintiff presented evidence
from which reasonable persons could find that the defendant acted
with bad faith, malice or retaliation."' 1 9 The court found that the very
action that was complained of by the employer (leaving the money in
the store safe overnight) and which resulted in Cloutier's termination
was in fact "condoned" by the employer. 20 Thus, "[d]ischarging the
plaintiff because a burglary occurred, when the defendant's loss resulted from actions it condoned, could be found to involve bad faith
,,12
and retaliation ....
In applying the second prong of the two-part test,' 2 2 the court
first noted that the public policy exception need not be based solely
on public policies delineated by statute and that non-statutory policies
were also relevant. 2 3 Cloutier claimed that the public policy supporting his cause of action was that articulated by the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), which requires that "[a]n employer
has the duty to 'furnish to each of his employees employment and a
place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees."'" 24 The court then found that Cloutier's employer:
118 Id. at 1143-44; see supra text accompanying note 107.
119 Id.at 1143.
120 Id.at 1143-44.
121 Id.at 1144. The court also held that bad faith could also be found in the
method through which Cloutier was terminated. The court noted that after 36 years
of employment with the employer, "plaintiff was suspended after a five-minute meeting and then discharged in an equally cursory manner." Id. Further, the assistant
manager on duty, who admitted he forgot to make the deposit, was suspended but was
also reinstated while Cloutier was not. The employer's rationale for this dichotomy in
treatment was that the manager was responsible for the cash in the store "at all times."
Id.But since only the assistant manager was at the store, and he was subject to the
collective bargaining agreement, Cloutier was the only one who could in fact make
the deposit. The court indicated that:
[t]hus, the plaintiff was always responsible for [the store's] cash, even on his
day off, and could not delegate that responsibility. Certainly, under these
circumstances, bad faith could be found to have motivated the defendant to
discharge the plaintiff, particularly in light of the fact that [the employer]
had administered discipline only three times as a result of the ninety-six robberies that had occurred in the [employer's] various stores during the past
five years.
Id.
122 See supra text accompanying note 107.
123 Cloutier, 436 A.2d at 1144.
124 Id. at 1144-45 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1) (1994)).
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could be found to have breached this duty by requiring the plaintiff
to travel to the bank, unprotected, with substantial sums of
money.... By creating a hazardous environment, [the employer]
ignored OSHA policy. The plaintiff, however, enforced the OSHA
directive by not forcing those in charge in his absence to imperil
themselves by making deposits. However, with or without the existence of OSHA, the facts before us support the conclusion that the
plaintiff was discharged for furthering the laudable public policy objective of protecting the employees who worked under him. 125
Thus, since Cloutier's circumstances met both prongs of the public policy exception test, the court affirmed the lower court
126
judgment.
The Harpercourt did not apply its own test in assessing Harper's
public policy claim. If these most recent analyses of the public policy
exception to the at will employment doctrine are in fact applied to
Harper,it is difficult to see how a public policy exception for employment termination applies. Assuming that Harper pleaded the facts of
his case and cause of action correctly, under the first prong of the
Cloutiertwo-part test, was Healthsource's termination of Harper "motivated by bad faith, malice, or retaliation"?1 2 7 Potentially. Harper alleges that his termination was in fact a result of his challenging
Healthsource's alleged "manipulating and skewing" of his patient
records. 2 8 Assuming this is true, Harper's termination could cer29
tainly be considered retaliation in a general sense.
However, under the second prong of the Cloutier test, has Harper
"demonstrate[d] that he was discharged because he performed an act

that public policy would encourage, or refused to do something that
public policy would condemn" in the manner which is consonant with
previous cases?13 0 It would appear not. In Cloutier,the articulable pol125 Id. at 1145. The court also indicated that an additional public policy ground to
hold for Cloutier was the fact that the employer violated the state statute which requires a day of rest; thus, when the employer made Cloutier responsible for the cash
in the store "at all times," it was contravening the public policy of the day of rest
statute. Id.
126 Id
127 See supra text accompanying note 107.
128 Harer,674 A.2d at 963.
129 However, this is not quite the "retaliation" as indicated in supranotes 88-95 and
accompanying text. Those retaliations seem to relate more to actions by the employee with respect to third parties which potentially harm the employer; for example, when an employee basically refuses to lie in testimony, in pricing, or in
government reporting to protect the pecuniary and other interests of the employer.
130 Cloutier, 436 A.2d at 1143-44; supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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icy was a safe working environment; 13 1 in the other statutory cases, the
policy to be furthered was non-discrimination 132 or the policy of maintaining open and honest communications between private employees
and government; 3 3 in Monge,'34 although not necessarily reached by
that court, it is arguable that the public policy would be to provide a
working environment free from sexual harassment consistent with federal civil rights law; in O'Su~livan,135 it would appear that the policy to

be furthered was to protect an employee from being required to perform duties outside the scope of his or her competence, thereby safeguarding the public health. Most importantly, has either Harper or
the court identified "a specific... public policy" 3 6 that has been contravened by Healthsource? Decidedly not; instead, the court simply
makes vague allusions to "public policy concerns . . .[of] the health
care arena."' 37 Thus, the public policy goals and actions in Harperdo
not appear to fall within the overriding themes of the public policy
exception regarding employment, nor has Harper or the court identified the relevant nexus between his circumstance and the violated
public policy.
c.

The Court's Other Citations

In addition to the fact that it is questionable whether the court
(or Harper) has articulated a specific public policy that has been violated as required, and thus has not applied its own rules on the issue
to the case, many of its other citations also work against it. In Lampe v.
PresbyterianMedical Center,'38 Lampe was a licensed practical nurse and
the head nurse of the intensive care unit. Due to the method of
scheduling, Lampe's staff was required to work long hours and extensive overtime. She was directed by her employer to minimize the overtime hours of her staff; however, Lampe believed that "she could not
fully comply with this request without jeopardizing the care of her
patients."1 39 After several meetings with her employer in an attempt
to work out this problem, Lampe received a termination notice. She
then sued her employer, alleging, inter alia, that her termination was
131 See Cloutier, 436 A.2d 1140; supra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
133 See supra notes 90-91, 93 and accompanying text.
134 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
135 390 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1978).
136 See Cloutier, 436 A.2d at 1143 (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d
505, 512 (N.J. 1980)) (emphasis added); supra note 106 (emphasis added).
137 Harper,674 A.2d at 966.
138 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
139 Id. at 514.
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against public policy and thus this exception to the at will employment doctrine should apply. The basis of her public policy argument
rested on state statutes regarding the nursing profession: First, she alleged that the public policy embodied in the statute which created the
nursing board was violated by her termination. The statute states that
"[a] ny person who practices as a professional nurse ... without submitting to the provisions of this part.., endangers the public health
thereby."'14 Second, Lampe based her public policy claim on the
power of the State Board of Nursing as articulated in the statute to
"withhold, deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew any license or
permit or to place on probation a professional nurse.... upon proof
that such person . . .has negligently or willfully acted in a manner
41
inconsistent with the health or safety of persons under her care."'
Lampe thus claimed that "the public policy enunciated in these statutes imposed on her a responsibility to take certain actions, and that
herjob was terminated because she attempted to fulfill that responsibility." 142 However, even though Lampe made specific reference to
arguably applicable statutes and the public policies expressed therein,
the court rejected her claim. The court relied on cases that allowed
for the public policy exception in circumstances where termination
occurred after employees filed workmen's compensation claims or
went on jury duty.143 The court indicated that the public policy exception applied only when the public policy in question was "a specifically enacted right and a duty, respectively."' 44 Lampe, on the other
hand:
relies on a broad, general statement of policy contained in a statute
which creates the State Board of Nursing and which gives that
Board the authority to discipline a nurse [who acts] in a manner
inconsistent with the health or safety of persons under her care.
Given the general language used in the statute .... we cannot impute to the General Assembly an intent to modify the contractual
relationships between hospitals and their employees in such
145
situations.
Thus, the court held that the public policy exception did not extend to circumstances where medical care could be potentially jeopardized even though the statute regulating the employee's profession
140 Id. at 515 (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-38-201 (1973)).
141 Id. (quoting COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-38-217 (1973)).
142 Id.
143 Id. (citing Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973)
(workmen's compensation); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (jury duty)).
144 Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 515-16 (emphasis added).
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mandated actions and provided for penalties if these dictates were not
adhered to. Lampe's cause of action failed due to the "general" nature of the statutes on which she relied. This requirement of specificity is consistent with the Cloutier court's second prong of its two part
test.' 46
Once again, it is difficult to see just how the Harpercourt's own
citation assists it. The only discussion in Harperthat would seem relevant to Lampe 4 7 would be the court's references to the New Hampshire statute that relates to preferred provider agreements between
health insurers and physicians.148 But by the court's own characterization, "the legislature [only] stated the general policy behind the chapter, that is, that preferred provider agreements must be 'fair and in
the public interest." 49 Thus, by its own words, the court does not
fulfill its own specificity test with respect to the public policy exception
as articulated in Cloutier,150 nor does it fulfill the public policy excep51
tion standard of another court to which it cites.'
Further, the Harper court's interesting choice of citations does
not end there. The court's cited cases in support of its general refusal
to enforce contracts "that contravene[ I] public policy" 15 2 also seem
inapplicable. The court relies on two cases: Audley v. Melton 153 and
Technical Aid Corp. v. Allen.154 However, in Audley, the court in fact
146 See supra notes 107, 122-25 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
148 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:1 (1991).
149 Harper,674 A.2d at 966 (emphasis supplied). The statute states that:
The purpose of this chapter is to assure that health benefit plans encourage
covered persons to seek health care services from preferred providers and
that contracts or agreements between preferred providers and health care
insurers are fair and in the public interest. Further, this chapter establishes
reasonable regulatory requirements for health care insurers in a manner to
contain health care costs while preserving the quality of care.
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:1 (1991).
Further, the court cites somewhat backhandedly N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 420-C:5a (Supp. 1996); "RSA chapter 420-C creates some parameters for preferred provider
agreements between health insurers and physicians, similar to the one in this case.
See, e.g., RSA 420-C:5-a (Supp. 1995) (prohibiting health care insurers from limiting
their liability in preferred provider agreements for actions of physicians)." Harper,
674 A.2d at 966. However, this reference is somewhat disingenuous because the referenced statute only became effective January 1, 1996, after the facts of the current
cause of action, and thus has no applicability herein.
150 See Cloutier, 436 A.2d 1140; supra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
151 See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
152 Harper,674 A.2d at 965.
153 640 A.2d 777 (N.H. 1994).
154 591 A.2d 262 (N.H. 1991).
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held that general releases against liability are enforceable and not void
against public policy.' 55 This holding would appear to support the
termination without cause clause in Harper. And in Technical Aid, the
court held that although an employer did not act in good faith when
obtaining an employee's signature on a set of restrictive covenants,
the covenants were generally enforceable against the employee. 156 So
even when covenants are imposed upon the employee in bad faith by
the employer, the court has in fact enforced them. Applying this to
Harper, his termination without cause clause would seem ever more
unchallengeable.
Finally, "appl[ying] public policy concerns to the health care
arena," 5 7 the court cites Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hospital.'58
However, the Brickercase is a case of termination of medical staff privileges at a hospital where the court simply reviewed the process of termination to assure it was not "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable," 59
i.e., whether the promise made by the hospital that it would follow
certain procedures for termination was fulfilled. However, in Harper,
the court is not simply assessing the process of termination (i.e.,
155 Audley, 640 A.2d at 779. The court held that since there was no explicit disclaimer against liability for the defendant's own negligence, although enforceable if it
had been in the appropriate form, the plaintiff was entitled to have the opportunity to
show that defendant was negligent. Id. (citing Barnes v. New Hampshire Karting
Ass'n, 509 A.2d 151, 154 (N.H. 1986)). Note also that disclaimers have been held to
generally not be against public policy. See Anders v. Mobil Chem. Co., 559 N.E.2d
1119 (ll. App. Ct. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for employer under a disclaimer that prevented the formation of a contract which would limit employer's right
to terminate at will and rejecting employee's claim that these disclaimers should be
limited as against public policy); see also supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
156 There were three paragraphs of restrictive covenants; the court held that two
of them were valid. TechnicalAid, 591 A.2d at 275. The covenant that was unenforceable was a geographic limitation; because the goodwill associated with the employee
extended only to customers he had contact with in his capacity as an employee in the
local area, the unlimited geographic scope of the covenant was too broad to protect
the legitimate interests of the employer. Id. at 267. However, covenants that restricted employee from soliciting or diverting business from clients that became
known to him through his former employment for an 18 month period were enforceable, as were covenants that prohibited the employee from soliciting, diverting, competing for accounts and personnel, or attempting to influence employer's customers
or technical personnel not to do business with employer. Id. at 268-74. It bears emphasizing that these provisions were enforceable despite an. absence of good faith on
the part of the employer. Id. at 271.
157 Harper,674 A.2d at 966.
158 281 A.2d 589 (N.H. 1971).
159 Id. at 592. Bricker simply reflects the due process nature and right of appeal
when a physician's quality of care is being questioned and does not reach whether the
hospital had the right to vote to deny or revoke a physician's privileges.
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whether Healthsource in fact followed appropriate and promised termination procedures) but indeed the merits of the termination itself.
Thus, this case "appl[ying] public policy concerns to the health care
arena"'160 would appear to have little direct applicability to Harper.
Overall, with regard to direct support of the public policy exceptions to the at will employment doctrine through common law, the
Harpercourt does not provide reference to a specific public policy that
has been violated by Healthsource's actions as required by its own jurisdictional and cited standards. 16 1 Further, the court's other case citations seem to contravene its reasoning or be simply inapplicable to
the case.
d.

The Court's "Several Relationships" Discussion

To bolster its public policy arguments, the court alludes to the
"[s]everal relationships in our society [which] stand on a different
footing from the rest. The most visible are those between wife and
husband, lawyer and client, pastor and penitent, and physician and
patient." 162 The discussion of these relationships, supported only by
citations to New Hampshire rules on evidence and Wigmore's treatise
on evidence, somehow show that there is a significant public policy
justifying review of Harper's termination. 163 These allusions and citations also somehow support the "substantial interest in the relationship between health maintenance organizations and their preferred
physicians ....,"164 However, again, it is difficult to see just how a
specific public policy is violated by a termination of a physician under a
termination without cause clause by reference to the rules of evidence
65
or a policy regarding privileged patient-physician communications.1
Further, on closer examination, the listing of these "several relationships" (without citations) does not assist the court in its desired special
treatment of the Harper-Healthsource relationship. First, the reference to spousal relations seems to have no relevance here. In this
discussion, Harper is, as the court notes, apparently challenging his
termination because "the termination of his relationship with Health160 Id.
161 See supra notes 107, 122-25, 138-45 and accompanying text.
162 Harper,674 A.2d at 966.
163 Id. (citing N.H. R. EviD. 503 and 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285, at 527
(McNaughton rev. 1961)). •
164 Id. (citing N.H. H.R.J. 1135-36 (1996) ("describing access to health care at a
competitive price via health maintenance organizations as a 'broad, generalized social
and economic problem of great importance to New Hampshire citizens"')).
165 Id.
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source affects more than just his own interest." 166 However, the circumstance is that Healthsource, with some power to terminate
Harper, has somehow affected third parties by terminating him, which
in turn, somehow, is in violation of some specific public policy as illustrated by the patient-physician evidentiary privilege. Thus, the reference by the court to the special relationship between spouses,
equivalent to the special relationship between Harper and his patients,
seems to be inappropos since there is no party that can threaten to
sever the spousal relationship akin to Healthsource's ability to sever
167
the patient-physician relationship.
The reference to lawyer and client relationships, however, appears more relevant. If a lawyer who is terminated by a law firm or
other employer illustrates some specific public policy that has been
violated due to the lawyer's severance or potential severance from his
or her clients, Harper and the court may be on more firm ground.
However, again, the court's own citations work against it. The court
cites Wieder v. Skala,1 68 where the New York Court of Appeals considered the termination of an attorney from a law firm. On the issue of
whether the termination of the attorney was "in violation of this
State's public policy,"'1 69 the court stated that
[p]laintiff argues... that the dictates of public policy... have such
force as to warrant our recognition of the tort of abusive discharge ....
While the arguments are persuasive and the circumstances here compelling, we have consistently held that "significant
alteration of employment relationships, such as plaintiff urges, is
170
best left to the Legislature."
166 Id.
167 Of course, perhaps if one spouse's parent had the power to terminate the marriage, thus affecting the other spouse, the analogy might be more appropriate.
Although this may be the actual circumstance in some marriages, the law usually does
not delve into such family matters. "In respect of these promises [between spouses]
each house is a domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run, and to which
his officers do not seek to be admitted." Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571, 579 (1919)
(Atkin, LJ.).
168 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992).
169 Id. at 106.
170 Id. at 110 (quoting Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 506 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1987)); see
also Borden v. Johnson, 395 S.E.2d 628, 629 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
The courts of this state have consistently held that they will not usurp the
legislative function, and, under the rubric that they are the propounders of
'public policy' .... [I]n the absence of any express statutory provision for
such a civil remedy ....
we decline to create judicially such a remedy.

Courts may interpret laws, but may not change them.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The court thus rejected any public policy exception when an attorney is terminated from a law firm. 17 1 Similarly, there does not
seem to be any applicable public policy exception for termination of
pastors.1 72 And of course, physicians have not succeeded on any public policy arguments when terminated by managed care or other
173
providers.
Thus, on the basis of the general common law, jurisdictionally
relevant law, court-cited law, and other considerations, it appears that
the required bases for an application of the public policy exception to
the traditional at will nature of general employment relationships is
74
lacking in this case.'
171 Interestingly, the court did not dismiss the implied-in-fact potential of the relationship. It noted that because of the "unique characteristics of the legal profession,"
Wieder, 609 N.E.2d at 109 (i.e., because they are not only employees of the firm but
are also officers of the court and thus "responsible in a broader public sense for their
professional obligations," id. at 108), there was an implied-in-fact understanding that
"both the associate and the firm in conducting the practice [of law] will do so in
accordance with the ethical standards of the profession." Id. The attorney was challenging the firm's reluctance to report a fellow associate to the bar for violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. However, even in this "unique" case between
lawyer and law firm, where both plaintiff and the firm are engaged in "a common
professional enterprise," id. at 110, the court indicated that "we, by no means, suggest
that each provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be deemed incorporated as an implied-in-law term in every contractual relationship between or
among lawyers." Id. at 109.
This seems to be consistent with other courts. There is a significant burden to
overcome when alleging that the code of ethics or responsibility acts as the basis for
the public policy exception.
The courts require that the Code represent a clear expression of public policy, the Code provisions relied on define a standard of conduct beneficial to
the public and not only the member of the profession, the member of the
profession explicitly refers to rights and responsibilities pursuant to the
Code, and that the member is not solely motivated by his or her own morals.
FrankJ. Cavico, Employment At Will and PublicPolicy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 527 (1992)
(citations omitted).
172 See Blauert v. Schupmann, 63 N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1954). The court found that:
2. Where 'Solemn Call' [of the church] in writing constitutes employment contract between pastor and church organization, and there is nothing therein or in the
church constitution or bylaws which provides that such employment be for any definite term, under principles generally applicable to employment contracts at will, pastor may be discharged by church at any time without cause.
Id. at 579.
173 See, e.g., Liang, supra note 21. Further, there is no prohibition against termination for wholly economic reasons with the courts giving great deference to "medical
business judgment." Id., nn.173-76 and accompanying text.
174 Note that in addition to the lack of support that the law or facts give to a public
policy exception here, the employer may also assert a business necessity defense
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Good Faith and Fair Dealing
a.

The General Common Law

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a specific,
legally implied promise imputed to the employer which imposes a legally enforceable obligation not to terminate an employee in bad faith
or in violation of public policy.175 Thus, it can be considered a subset
176
of the public policy exception to at will agreements.
This duty has been generally recognized in two distinct circumstances: when an employee is terminated without cause after long
years of service, and when an employer terminates an employee to
avoid paying the employee bonuses or compensation. 7 7 For example, in the classic case to find this duty in the employment context,
78
Cleay v. American Airlines,1
Cleary had been employed by the airline
for eighteen years when he was discharged. Although the company
claimed that it fired Cleary due to theft, he claimed that, in fact, the
79
company fired him because he was engaged in union activities.'
The court apparently agreed, and held that Cleary's termination was
wrongful because it violated the implied covenant of good faith and
which could override a public policy exception. If situations within the employment
context occur which result in the termination of an employee under the prohibited
rubric of some public policy, the employer can still prevail if it can show, even admitting that the reason for termination was in violation of the public policy, that there
was a legitimate business reason for the termination. See, e.g., Zoerb v. Chugach Elec.
Ass'n, 798 P.2d 1258 (Alaska 1990) (holding that a reduction in work force due to
legitimate and sufficient business reasons may constitute good cause to terminate an
employee); Alexander v. Kay FinlayJewelers, 506 A.2d 379 (NJ. 1986) (holding that
the termination of an employee who was fired for filing suit against employer in pay
dispute was not against public policy since employer had legitimate business interest
in being free from employee suit harassments); Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,
319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974) (holding that employer termination of employee for
complaints regarding safety of company products was allowable since plaintiff "made
a nuisance of himself, and the company discharged him to preserve administrative
order in its own house").
175 HENRY H. PERRrIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL LAW AND PRAcricE § 4.9 (1992).
176 To illustrate the sometimes widely overlapping considerations, see, e.g., Sheppard v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be violated by terminating an
employee immediately after his move across country to take the job offered to him by
the employer even though he was clearly at will); Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
267 Cal. Rptr. 618 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding that termination of an employee for
refusal to take a drug test might be violative of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing).
177 Pennington, supra note 87, at 1592.
178 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980).
179 Id. at 724.
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fair dealing found within every contract including that of at will employment. 180 Thus, because the airline acted in an attempt to deprive
its employee of the benefits of employment without just cause, and
particularly on the basis of the employee's long-term employment, the
company exhibited a lack of good faith and breached the implied
covenant.181
The standard case for demonstrating the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the compensation setting is Fortune v.
National Cash Register C0.182 In this case, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts recognized the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the context of a termination of an employee who had
twenty-five years of experience with the company and who had just
closed a multimillion dollar sales order entitling him to substantial
bonuses. The court affirmed the jury verdict which found that the
employer had acted in bad faith in terminating the employee because
18 3
it was attempting to deprive him of the full commission on his sale.
The court specifically noted that it was not recharacterizing the at will
nature of the relationship but instead, stated "that where, as here,
commissions are to be paid for work performed by the employee, the
180
181

Id. at 729.
Id. at 728, 729. Note that the Cleary decision has come to stand for the proposition that a good faith and fair dealing covenant is implied only when there is longtime
employment or the employer has established a policy for adjudicating disputes. Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors, 479, 199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (Ct. App. 1984).
182 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
183 Id. at 1258; see also Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(holding that even though sales representative compensation agreement allowed for
retroactive monthly sales quota increases at management's sole discretion, discretion
limited by covenant of good faith and fair dealing such that the representative would
not be deprived of his reasonably earned compensation); Mitford v. Lasala, 666 P.2d
1000 (Alaska 1963) (holding that good faith and fair dealing prevents termination of
an employee to prevent the employee from sharing in future profits); Gram v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 429 N.E.2d 21, 29 (Mass. 1981), with later appealregardingdamages after
remand, 461 N.E.2d 796 (Mass. 1984) (holding that "the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing imposed on an employer requires that the employer be liable for the loss
of compensation that is ... clearly related to the employee's past service"); Maddaloni
v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, 422 N.E.2d 1379 (Mass. App. Ct.) (affirming a jury finding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was breached by employer terminating employee to avoid paying bonuses), modified, 438 N.E.2d 351
(Mass. 1982); Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 579 A.2d 1252 (NJ. 1990) (embracing the
Tymshare analysis and holding that employer, with sole discretion to retroactively adjust sales quotas, was acting in bad faith if it prevented the employees from receiving
bonuses earned). But see Kumpf v. Steinhaus, 779 F.2d 1323 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding
that termination to satisfy greed of a supervisor for a larger share of commissions does
not violate public policy).
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employer's decision to terminate its at will employee should be made
84
in good faith."'
However, the implied covenant is the "least recognized exception
to [the] employment at will" doctrine.' 8 5 The majority of states assess8 6
ing this issue have in fact refused to recognize this cause of action.'
Even those courts which have given some legitimacy to the doctrine
severely limit its application:
[T]he implied obligation [of good faith and fair dealing] is in aid
and furtherance of other terms of the agreement of the parties. No
obligation can be implied, however, which would be inconsistent
with other terms of the contractual relationship.
[Here] ....
plaintiffs employment was at-will, a relationship in
which the law accords the employer an unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time. In the context of such an employment it would be incongruous to say that an inference may be
drawn that the employer impliedly agreed to a provision which
1 87
would be destructive of his right of termination.
184 Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1256.
185

Pennington, supra note 87, at 1592.
CHAR.ES G. BAxALY, JR &JOEL M. GROSSMAN, THE MODERN LAW or EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS § 10.1, at 184 (1989).
187 Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y. 2d 293, 304-05 (1983); see also
Orthonet v. A.B. Med., Inc., 990 F.2d 387, 392 (8th Cir. 1993) (independent claim of
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot stand independent
of underlying breach of contract claim); Alan's of Atlanta, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903
F.2d 1414, 1429 (11th Cir. 1990) (implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is not an
independent contract term subject to breach apart from other contract terms, but
only modifies meaning of express terms); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373 (Cal. 1989) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be invoked
to contradict express term and prevent employer from terminating at will contract);
Tollefson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Diego, 268 Cal. Rptr. 550 (Ct. App. 1990)
(implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot contradict an express contract term); Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, (Utah 1991) (implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing assists in interpreting contract rights but cannot add
rights or override express provisions). Other cases have held that there is no covenant exception. See, e.g., Home v. Gibson Well Serv. Co., 894 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir.
1990); Minihan v. American Pharm. Ass'n, 812 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1987); English v.
General Elec. Co., 765 F. Supp. 293 (E.D.N.C. 1991), affid, 977 F.2d 572 (4th Cir.
1992); Hew-Len v. Woolworth, 737 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Haw. 1990); Hostettler v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l Inc., 624 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Satterfield v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985); Grant v. Butler, 590 So. 2d 254
(Ala. 1991); Kelly v. Gill, 544 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982); Harrison v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 546
N.E.2d 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Keystone Carbon Co. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992); Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841 (Kan. 1987); Wyant v. SCM
Corp., 692 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc.,
486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984); Cockels v. International Bus. Expositions, Inc., 406 N.W.2d
186

NOTRE

DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 72:3

Further, courts in the limited number of jurisdictions that have
accepted the implied covenant as applied to employment relationships have not extended the doctrine to require that an at will employee be terminated only for good cause.' 8 8 And, of course, the
burden is on the employee to show that there was bad faith in his or
89
her termination.'
In addition, even aside from the fact that it has been specifically
held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may not
apply to health care contracts, 190 and assuming that the implied cove465 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); Hunt v. IBM Mid-America Employees Fed. Credit Union,
384 N.W.2d 853 (Minn. 1986); Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So. 2d 1086 (Miss.
1987); Neighbors v. Kirksville College of Osteopathic Med., 694 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985); White v. Ardan, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 27 (Neb. 1988); Melnick v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 1105 (N.M. 1988); Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op,
409 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1987); Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206
(N.D. 1987); Brandenburger v. Hilti, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Burk
v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989); Elliott v. Tektronic, Inc., 796 P.2d 361 (Or.
Ct. App. 1990); Breen v. Dakota Gear &Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 1988); Winograd v. Willis, 789 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984); Armstrong v. Richland Clinic, Inc., 709 P.2d 1237
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985); Shell v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 174 (W. Va.
1990); Mobil Coal Producing Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985).
188 See, e.g., Crossen v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1076 (N.D. Cal.
1982) (holding that an employment agreement which expressly provides for termination at will of either party will not have an implied term not to terminate except for
good cause); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985)
(holding that a no-cause termination of an employee does not breach the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an at will employment relationship); Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984) (accepting the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing but indicating that claim for breach cannot be based
simply on the absence of good faith in the termination); Cort v. Bristol-Meyers Co.,
431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982) (holding that there is no breach of good faith or fair
dealing implied covenant on the basis of lack of good cause in termination, and even
if employer provides a pretext or false reason for the discharge, the employer is not
liable unless the actual reason is contrary to public policy). Note that it is important
to distinguish between termination that would be only "for cause" versus a promise
only to provide pretermination procedures. The former limits the power of the employer to in fact discharge the employee generally unless some articulable valid reason is provided. The latter, however, does not limit the employer to terminate, but
only requires the employer to satisfy his or her obligations by providing such
procedure.
189 See Kravetz v. Merchants Distrib., Inc., 440 N.E.2d 1278, 1281 (Mass. 1982)
(placing burden of proving breach of good faith and fair dealing implied covenant on
the plaintiff-employee).
190 Courts have not necessarily found such an implied obligation in medical contexts; see, e.g., Mayer v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc., 909 P.2d 1323 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1995) (indicating good faith exception to employment at will doctrine not applicable in a contract which specifically permitted no cause termination); Hrehorovich
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nant does apply to this case, it still appears that the Harpercourt is on
shaky ground. Harper does not seem to be within the general categories of the doctrine where it is recognized, i.e., where the employee
has extended employment tenure or where the employer is attempting to avoid payment of some compensation or bonus. 19 1 Specifically,
Harper's nine year relationship with Healthsource would not appear
to be within the bounds of Cleary,' 92 where the plaintiff had an employment tenure double that time, nor within the circumstances of
Fortune,'9 3 where the plaintiff had a twenty-five year tenure as well as
substantial bonuses to which he was entitled. The Harpercourt seems
to be using the terms "good faith" and "fair dealing" in a context
outside of the legal terms of art they are according to the caselaw.
Although there could have been some articulable action by Healthsource that fell within the traditional common law notions of good
faith and fair dealing in the employment context, the court did not
identify it within the parameters as understood by other jurisdictions
which accept the implied covenant.
b. The Jurisdictionally Relevant Common Law
Further, the court is once again hoist by its own petard through
the citations it utilizes in support of its contentions. With regard to
the good faith and fair dealing covenant, the major case the court
relies upon is Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp.194 In that case, Justice
Souter (then sitting on the New Hampshire Supreme Court) concluded that a buyer's refusal to release a portion of an escrow amount
pending determination of the sale price of the company by a third
party was not a breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. 9 5 The Centronics court cited with favor the trial court's assessment of the case:
"[we] the [trial] Court cannot insert a provision in the contract for
partial payments [from the escrow] where such provision does not
exist. I [Seller] should have demanded a mechanism for partial
v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., 614 A.2d 1021 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (holding that there is
no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for at-will employees such as physicians on a hospital staff); Aung v. Fontenot, No. 05-91-00846-CV, 1992 WL 57471
(Tex. App. Mar. 24, 1992) (no implied covenant of good faith if bargaining power
between parties is equal).
191 See supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text.
192 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Ct. App. 1980); see supra notes 178-81 and accompanying
text.
193 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); see supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
194 562 A.2d 187 (N.H. 1989).
195 Id. at 195.
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payments from the Escrow Fund if the arbitration process [by the

third party] lagged ....The Court will not renegotiate the contract
between the parties to obtain this result. To the extent [the Seller]
made a less advantageous contract, it must now abide by the terms of
'196
that contract as originally agreed."

Thus, the Centronics court agreed with the trial court and gave
great weight to the express terms of the agreement. 9 7 This alone
would seem to be damaging to Harper, as the terms of his contract
simply stipulated that he could be terminated without cause. Even if
Harper "made a less advantageous contract, [he] must now abide by
the terms of that contract as originally agreed."'198
However, the court also went through an extensive analysis of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although the Harper
court only quoted the employment section of the case, 199 it is instructive to consider each area that Centronics covered since it is the most
thorough, jurisdictionally relevant treatment of the issue.
According to the Centronics court, the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing has been applied in three categories of cases: circumstances of contract formation, termination of at will employment relationships, and circumstances where one party has discretion in
contract performance. 20 0 In contract formation, the implied duty requires that a party refrain from misrepresentation and correct any
subsequently discovered error "insofar as any representation is intended to induce, and is material to, another party's decision to enter
into a contract in justifiable reliance upon it."201 Violation of this implied good faith duty could thus allow for voidability of a subsequently
formed agreement by the adversely affected party due to its antece20 2
dent nature.
The obligation under this category would appear to be inapplicable in the Harpercase. Harper does not claim any fraud in the inducement of the contract between the parties. Further, even if there was,
20 3
the resultant remedy would simply be rescission of the contract,
which would effectively be a victory for Healthsource since it merely
seeks an end to its relationship with Harper.
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id. at 190 (citing trial court) (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Harper,674 A.2d at 965.
Centronics, 562 A.2d at 191.
Id.
Id.

203 Id.

1997]

DESELECTION

AND

PATIENT-PHYSICIAN

RELATIONSHIPS

837

The Centronicscourt then goes on to discuss the application of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in the employment at will
05
context. 20 4 Here, the court relies on Cloutier2
for its discussion. As
20 6
indicated above,
employers violate the implied duty of good faith
and fair dealing against an employee at will if the employer terminates
the employee in bad faith or with malice in relation to some act of
omission or commission that the employee takes "in consonance with
public policy."20 7 Also as noted above, Harper appears not to fail
within this employment at will doctrine exception as articulated by
Cloutier.208
Finally, the court discusses the discretion cases2 09 which are arguably the most relevant to Harper and Healthsource, since Healthsource has the discretion to terminate the contract at will. Good faith
and fair dealing cases have as their common thread the prevention of
one party from retaining a benefit of the bargain that is reasonably
due the other. Thus, for example, the court reviews the "seminal case
on the implied obligation of good faith performance":2 10 Griswold v.
Heat Inc.,21 1 which held that "a contract to pay $200 a month for 'such
[personal] services as [the plaintiff], in his sole discretion, may
render' required the plaintiff to provide a level of services consistent
with good faith."2 12 Here, to save the agreement from unenforceability, the court limited the discretion of the plaintiff to some amount of
performance reasonable under the circumstances. 2 13 Thus, so as to
prevent one party who has given consideration for the contract (the
$200 a month) from not obtaining the benefits of the bargain (at least
some services), the court implied a reasonable amount of services was
2 14
required.
As applied to Harper,Griswold may not be helpful. Indeed, Griswold seems to speak to circumstances where one party has given consideration and the other, with the apparent power not to give the
understood return consideration, is required to provide at least some
reasonable amount. However, there is no issue in Harper as to
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214

Id. at 190-91.
436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981); see supra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
Centronics, 562 A.2d at 191.
Supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
Centronics, 562 A.2d at 191.
Id. at 191-92.
229 A.2d 183 (N.H. 1967).
Centronics, 562 A.2d at 191 (quoting Griswo0 229 A.2d at 187).
Id. at 192.
Id.

NOTRE DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 72:3

whether Healthsource is providing consideration (remuneration) in
exchange for Harper's services. Consideration flows from both to
both with Healthsource paying Harper for services and Harper agreeing to render services in exchange for payment. It is only the termination of that flow, not the reasonableness of the amount after one party
has provided its consideration, that is in question. 21 5
The Centronics court then goes on to review the case where an
implied duty to act was held to be within the duty of good faith and
fair dealing: Seaward Construction Co. v. City of Rochester.2 16 Here, the
city of Rochester contracted with Seaward Construction to perform
construction work for the city; however, the city was only obligated to
pay for the work done with funds it received from the federal government.2 17 The contract between the city and the company did not expressly state any duty on the part of the city to in fact try and secure
the funds. 2 18 After a conflict arose as to the charges made by the construction company, the city, in an attempt to take advantage of the
lack of an express duty to obtain the funds, refused to ask for the
federal money.21 9 The Seaward court held that the city could not defend against the construction company's claim by pointing to the lack
of federal funds to pay the company without also showing that it had
fulfilled its duty of good faith and fair dealing by attempting to obtain
the money.220 Thus, the goal of preventing one party from not receiving the benefits under the contract after providing its consideration
through requiring the other to provide the reasonably expected consideration was also accomplished here as in Griswold using the implied
22 1
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The application of the Seaward case's conception of the implied
covenant to the Harper and Healthsource dispute is as unhelpful as
Griswold.2 22 Seaward had a right to at least some remuneration for its
215 An analogy could be the concept of quantum meruit. When one party provides
services with no naked obligation of the other to pay (analogizing in this case to a
discretion that includes, without the law stepping in, the option to "pay" nothing), the
law will provide that the latter party must pay some reasonable amount in line with
the reasonable value or action related to the first party's services. However, again, in
the Harper circumstance, there is no question as to an exchange which would allow
one party, Healthsource, to get something for nothing.
216 Centronics,562 A.2d at 192 (citing Seaward Constr. Co. v. City of Rochester, 383
A.2d 707 (N.H. 1978)).

217 Id.
218
219
220
221
222

Id. (citing Seaward Constr., 383 A.2d at 708).
Id. (citing Seaward Constr., 383 A.2d at 708).
Id.
Id.; see supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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work under the construction agreement; the city attempted to "spring
a legalism" 2 23 to avoid liability through a maneuver which could be

literally interpreted as part of its set of options regarding its obligation
to pay. However, because Seaward had already provided its consideration for the contract, the city could not avoid its obligation to furnish
its expected return consideration for the endeavor.
Similarly, in Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co.,22 4 the Centronics court discussed the good faith and fair dealing duty in the context of the timing of insurance company payouts. The court held that
the insurance company "would violate an implied obligation of good
faith if it delayed payment owed to its own insured for the purpose of
225
coercing the insured into accepting less than the full amount due."
Thus, as in the previous cases, one party's discretion as to performance or "spring[ing] a legalism" will be limited by a good faith and
fair dealing duty so as to provide the benefit that was bargained for.
Relating the cases, the Centronics court indicated that "[s]ince the
timeliness of payment is often essential to the value of insurance, the
insured in Lawton, like the corporation in Griswold and the contractor
in Seaward, could otherwise have been effectively deprived of consideration for his own prior performance." 2 26 Again, the dispute between
223 1 JAMES J. WHrIE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 125-26
(3d ed. 1988). A similar circumstance to the case is hypothesized by White and
Summers:
Buyer butchers and sells poultry for Kosher poultry markets in the area.
Buyer's competitors can produce larger volumes and therefore sell at lower
prices. To meet this competition, buyer enters negotiations with seller for
processing equipment which will enable buyer to produce larger volumes.
Seller visits buyer's plant and learns that the equipment is to be for "Kosher
operation." Yet the contract later signed says nothing of "Kosher operation"
and includes the following conspicuous merger clause which buyer specifically signs: "I understand that the contract between the parties consists solely
of this written agreement and that there are no implied warranties whatsoever." The equipment is delivered and it turns out not to be for a Kosher
operation. If buyer refuses to pay the price or seeks damages, he will want to
prove an express oral warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. And a
court might permit him to do this, for seller inserted the merger clause, so
far as the Kosher operation warranty was concerned, in bad faith (at least if
the seller and notjust the seller's salesman knew of "Kosher operation"). In
other words, he was fully aware of the buyer's needs and knowingly tried to
spring a legalism on him as an excuse for not meeting these needs. This
violates the general and nonvariable obligation of good faith performance
imposed by section 1-203 of the [U.C.C.].
Id.
224 392 A.2d 576 (N.H. 1978).
225 Centronics, 562 A.2d at 192 (citing Lawton, 392 A.2d at 580).
226 Id.
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Harper and Healthsource does not seem to be grounded in such deprivation of consideration or avoidance of obligation; and thus, the
Centronics court's position on the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing does not seem to encompass or support Harper.
Finally, the Centronics court briefly reviewed other similar cases
cited by the parties.2 27 In each, the court found that again, the imposition of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing was of import
so as to prevent one party from using legal form to prevent the other
from obtaining at least some reasonable return and expected consideration. The court discussed three cases. First, in Atlas Truck Leasing,
Inc. v. FirstNH Banks, Inc.,228 which held that a contract for the use of

automobiles, payment of which would only be on a per mile basis,
required the lessee to make some reasonable good faith efforts to use
the cars; the Centronicscourt noted that "[a] bsent such a construction,
the contract would have obligated the lessor to make vehicles available
to the lessee [as consideration], but without any right to receive consideration in return except at the lessee's unfettered sufferance in
choosing to drive the lessor's vehicles. '22 9 The court then discussed
Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,23° which held that an employer vio-

lated his good faith duty when firing an employee so as to take advantage of a clause in the employee's contract that eliminated the
employee's right to commissions if he was discharged. These employment commission cases have been noted previously.2

31

The Centronics

court reiterated the importance of an expected return benefit:
"[h] ere, too, we see an otherwise unregulated right to discharge limited so as to preclude the employer from depriving his employee of
contract consideration to which the employee had already become entitled by virtue of his own performance. ''2 32 Finally, the court noted
that in Zilg v. Prentice-Hall,Inc., 23 3 similar to the above cases, a book

publisher was obligated in good faith to attempt to market an author's
book even though the contract did not contain any restriction as to
the amounts to be spent on promotion. Thus, the Centronics court
concluded that after the author had written and the publisher had
accepted the book, the book publisher was required to make some
reasonable efforts to market the book due to its implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing, since "[a] bsent such a construction, the pub227
228
229
230
231
232
233

Id. at 193.
808 F.2d 902 (1st Cir. 1987).
Centronics,562 A.2d at 193.
769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985).
See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
Centronics, 562 A.2d at 193.
717 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
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lisher would have been free to decline to publicize the book and so to
2 34
deprive the author of virtually the entire value of the contract."
Once again, the recurring theme is to invoke the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing in the context of preventing one party from
withholding from the other its expected consideration. And again,
these cases seem inapplicable to the Harper and Healthsource relationship, since there is no attempt to avoid providing a return consideration by a retreat to legal form. In Harper, both parties have
performed in line with their respective obligations: Harper has rendered health care services to Healthsource's patients, and Health235
source has paid for those services.
c.

The Functional Analysis of Bad Faith

The Centronics court also reviewed an objective theory of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, or perhaps more appropriately, reviewed what is bad faith, through a functional analysis. 23 6 In
describing this idea, the court noted that:
functional analysis of the obligation to observe good faith in discretionary contract performance applies objective criteria... to identify the unstated economic opportunities intended to be bargained
away by a promisor as a cost of performance, and it identifies bad
faith as a promisor's discretionary action subjectively intended... to recapture such an opportunity, thereby refusing to
23 7
pay an expected performance cost.

Applying this notion to some of the cases reviewed, the court
noted that similar results would ensue. As the Centronics court put it:
In Lawton, for example, by refusing to pay the policy proceeds, the
insurance company retained control of the funds, for whatever investment opportunity might be to its advantage. The company had
the money and kept it. So too in Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,
where the employer kept the commission money, and in Zilg v. Prentice-Hall, Inc., where the publisher retained the money it refused to
spend on advertising the author's book. In each of these cases, the
234 Centronics, 562 A.2d at 193.
235 It might be different, and the cases reviewed might be more applicable, if, for
example, Harper rendered services to Healthsource patients and, before payment,
Healthsource terminated Harper and refused payment for the previous services due
to a contract provision that only required payment to providers if they were active
members of Healthsource's medical staff.
236 Centronics, 562 A.2d at 194 (citing Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the
Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94 HARv.L. REv. 369 (1980)).
237 Id. (citations omitted).
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defendant's discretionary act of bad faith kept money in its pocket,

23 8
with the attendant opportunities to use that money as it saw fit.
Thus, from an economic perspective, when one party relinquishes economic opportunities as bargained-for consideration and
then later tries to recapture those opportunities, that party is acting in
239
bad faith, assessed objectively.
This functional analysis approach works quite strongly against
Harper. First, an "objective analysis of the parties' '[e]xpectations...
may be inferred from the express contract terms in light of the ordinary course of business and customary practice." 240 This standard
would distinctly require attention to Harper's express contract term:
the termination without cause clause. 24 1 Further, these clauses are
standard within the industry and deselection is currently an ordinary
business maneuver and custom. 2 4 2 Thus, this contract with the termination without cause clause represents bargained-away economic opportunities from the perspective of the parties at the time they
contracted for services and payment thereof. Harper, in accepting
the contract clause within his contract, bargained away the economic
opportunities that would have been attendant if the clause did not
exist as part of his cost of performance. Healthsource assessed the
economic value of the contract with the termination clause, and returned a level of consideration (agreed-to payment levels) for services
reflecting that contract's value. So in fact, under this analysis, it is
Harper that is acting in bad faith, not Healthsource. Since Harper is
the party that is trying to recapture foregone economic opportunities
that were "bargained away at the time of contracting" 243 by challenging the termination clause's validity, he is acting in bad faith under a
functional analysis. Indeed, if the lower court on remand were to give
Harper judgment by invalidating the termination without cause clause
due to actions by Healthsource which are deemed a violation of the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, it would be giving Harper
the economic value of a contract with some form of a termination only
with cause clause, an express part of his consideration bargained
away,244 and in fact would be penalizing the wrong party under this
economic analysis of good faith.

238
239
240
241
242
243
244
in the

Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. (quoting Burton, supra note 236, at 389).
See supra note 34.
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Centronics, 562 A.2d at 195 (quoting Burton, supra note 236, at 389).
Indeed, it would be likely that if there was no termination without cause clause
contract, Healthsource would never have entered into the relationship. Again,

1997]

DESELECTION AND

PATIENT-PHYSICIAN

RELATIONSHIPS

843

Thus, the extensive and thorough discussion of the Centronics
court regarding the duty of good faith and fair dealing provides no
support for a cause of action by Harper. In fact, there may be some
basis for a bad faith cause of action by Healthsource against Harper.
d.

The Court's Other Citations

The other cases the Harpercourt cites in its discussion of good
faith and fair dealing are similarly unavailing to its cause. The court
cites Douglas v. UnitedStates Fidelity & Guaranty Co.2 4 5 in support of the
good faith and fair dealing implied covenant.2 46 However, as related
to the Harper-Healthsource dispute, it would appear again to be inappropos. The Douglas court held that an insurance company which assumes responsibility of settlement negotiations for the insured owes a
duty of reasonable care to the insured to settle in good faith and the
insurance company can be held liable for negligently failing to settle. 247 However, Douglas relied on an agency theory of action for its
analysis:
[w] here one acts as agent under such [settlement negotiation] circumstances, he is bound to give the rights of his principal at least as
great consideration as he does his own.... The insurer cannot
betray the trust it had undertaken nor be relieved from the usual
rule that in such a case an agent must serve as he has promised to
248
serve.
Thus, the agency nature of the case completely takes it outside of
the relationship between the parties in Harper,who are clearly dealing
at arm's length. Further, the court notes that such a duty can in fact
be abrogated if "the contract so provides in explicit terms." 249 That
appears to be the case in Harper,i.e., the explicit termination without
cause clause. Hence, even if there was some ephemeral duty of good
faith and fair dealing, under Douglas, the "explicit terms" of Harper's
contract effectively avoid it.
The Harpercourt then cites Great Lakes Aircraft Co. v. City of ClaremontP ° for New Hampshire's broad view of the implied duty of good
faith and fair dealing. In fact, most of the case (and the quote within
these clauses are standard and the economic value of being able to terminate at will is
an extremely important provision for businesses like Healthsource. See supranotes 2-9

and accompanying text.
245 127 A. 708 (N.H. 1924).
246 Harper,674 A.2d at 965.
247 Douglas, 127 A. at 711.
248 Id.
249 Id. at 712.
250 608 A.2d 840 (N.H. 1992).
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the Harperdecision that was attributed to Great Lakes) is reasoned on
the basis of (and quoted from) the Centronics decision. 25' The Great
Lakes case was centered on fraudulent actions by a city in selling property which it represented as suitable for the activities of the buyer
when it knew the land was not.25 2 The buyer claimed a violation of
good faith and fair dealing on the basis of a lack of timely cure of the
2 53
fraud perpetrated on the buyer which resulted in its insolvency.
The Great Lakes court noted that the good faith duty was within the
third aspect of the Centronics discussion of good faith, i.e., when one
party has discretion2 54 (although it might be argued that in fact, the
Great Lakes circumstance was actually more appropriately considered
within the first section of the Centronics discussion on good faith, i.e.,
contract formation 255). The court indicated that the city was obligated to provide the consideration it bargained for after the other
party had performed, i.e., the city was obligated to take actions to
make the property suitable for the needs of the buyer as was represented by the city to the buyer when it sold the property. 2 56 Thus,
similar to the cases that were discussed in Centronics,2 57 a party is obligated to provide the reasonable and expected consideration to the
other party under a good faith duty after the other party has provided
its consideration.
Finally, the Harper court cites Bak-A-Lum Corp. v. Alcoa Building
Products258 as a general gesture toward the contention that the implied
covenant of good faith is contextual.2 5 9 However, again, its applicability to the Harpercase is unclear. Bak-A-Lum was a dispute between a
manufacturer and a distributor with regard to the appropriate extent
of notice needed to cancel an exclusive dealings arrangement in good
251 Harper,674 A.2d at 965.
252 Great Lakes, 608 A.2d at 843-44.
253 Id. at 844-45.
254 GreatLakes, 608 A.2d at 855 (citing Centronics,562 A.2d at 193).
255 See supranotes 200-02 and accompanying text. The Centronics court noted that
there is an implied duty of good faith so as to prevent a party from misrepresenting
and placing on a party the obligation to correct subsequently discovered errors that
would be central to one party entering into the contract. Centronics,562 A.2d at 190.
That would appear to be the case here. However, perhaps because this type of action
would most likely only give Great Lakes Aircraft the power to void the contract rather
than damages, the court allowed a breach of contract action.
256 GreatLakes, 608 A.2d at 855-56. The court characterized the city's duty as one
of a duty of cooperation.
257 See supra notes 209-35 and accompanying text.
258 351 A.2d 349 (N.J. 1976).
259 Harper,674 A.2d at 965-66.
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faith.2 60 But there was no question in the case as to the manufacturer's right to terminate the relationship; as the court notes,
"[p]laintiffs contention that the agreement was not terminable at will
without 'cause' . . . is without merit" 26 1 even in the context of some
rather unvalorious, indeed, bad faith, behavior on the part of the
manufacturer. 262 But termination and bad faith are in fact the critical
issues in the Harpercase, and to use Bak-A-Lum 2 63 for any proposition
regarding these issues is daring to say the least.
Thus, overall, it appears that the general legal theories which illustrate the exceptions to the traditional common law employment at
will doctrine do not support the Harper court's assessment in favor of a
cause of action for Harper. Further, the court's own citations provide
fodder for this proposition rather than supporting its own contentions. Hence employer-employee law seems rather a weak foundation
on which to build the house of contract and termination reviewability
as asserted by the court in this case.
B.

Independent Contractors

The Harper court consistently makes reference to, and its legal
analysis relies heavily upon, employer-employee relationships. For example: "In the pure employment context, a common law employment relationship that is terminable by either the employee or the
employer at any time is referred to as 'at will' ,,;264
Like most courts, we have carved out exceptions to the common law
employment-at-will doctrine, noting that in some cases "the employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining his
employment, and the public's interest in maintaining a proper bal2
ance between the two";

65

260 Bak-A-Lum, 351 A.2d at 352.
261 Id. (citations omitted).
262 The manufacturer was secretly planning to terminate the distributor's exclusive status. However, during the preparation to do this, the manufacturer induced
the distributor to make a large order for materials from the manufacturer, and the
manufacturer encouraged the distributor to enter into a new (more expensive) lease
and expand its warehouse facilities. Id. at 351.
263 See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text.
264 Harper,674 A.2d at 964 (citing Cloutier v. A. & P. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1142
(N.H. 1981)).
265 Id. at 964-65 (quoting Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 849, 551 (N.H.
1974)).
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and
The obligation to act in good faith in employment termination
cases "is an obligation implied in the contract itself, where it fulfills
the... function of limiting the power of an employer to terminate
a wage contract by discharging an at-will employee .... [A] n employer violates an implied term of a contract for employment at-will
by firing an employee out of malice or bad faith in retaliation for
action taken or refused by the employee in consonance with public
policy."

266

However, the court in a refreshing show of erudition notes that
"[s] trictly speaking, Harper's relationship with Healthsource is not an
employer-employee relationship." 267 And indeed, even though it itself
relies almost exclusively on employer-employee law for its holding in
266 Id. at 965 (quoting Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187, 191
(N.H. 1989)).
267 Id. at 965. The court goes on to say that "Healthsource does not control, and
has no right to control, the manner of performance of Harper's duties, for example"
in support of its contention that Harper is not an employee of Healthsource. Id.
First, physicians who contract with MCOs may in fact be under the control of the
MCO. See Liang, supra note 13. Second, there are a variety of tests to assess whether
an actor is an employee; since worker's compensation coverage, civil rights claims,

disability coverage, tort liability, and tax duties depend on this status, several tests
have been developed. See generally BAKALY & GROSSMAN, supranote 186, at § 2.1;John
Bruntz, The Employee/Independent ContractorDichotomy: A Rose Is Not Always a Rose, 8
HOFSTA LAB. LJ. 337 (1991); Patricia A. Davidson, Comment, The Definition of "Employee" Under Title VII: DistinguishingBetween Employees and Independent Contractors,53 U.
CIN. L. REV. 203 (1984); Michelle M. Lasswell, Note, Workman's Compensation:Determining the Status of a Worker as an Employee or an Independent Contractor,43 DRAKE L. REV.
419 (1994); Cliff E. Spencer, Comment, Oregon'sIndependent ContractorStatute: A Legislative Placebofor Employers, 31 WLLAmE--rE L. REV. 647 (1995). The court was most
likely referring to the standard common law test as stated in the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (2) (1958) which lists ten factors used to determine whether an
employment relationship exists:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the [employer] may
exercise over the details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality,
the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing the work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the
employer;
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the case, the court indicates that "[t]he trial court treated Harper as

making only a wrongful termination of employment argument and
applied the legal standards applicable in the employment context....
Although the relationship in this case is similar to an employment relationship, this was rror.1"268

If Harper is not considered an employee by the court, notwithstanding the fact that much of the court's analysis based on the employer-employee context would then be rendered moot, the
2 69
traditional dichotomy then makes him an independent contractor.
Independent contractors who deliver services under at will agree270 even in bad faith 2 71
ments are generally unilaterally terminable,
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of
[employer] and [employee]; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
The principal factor usually considered by courts, like the Harpercourt, is the
right of control. BAxALY & GROSSMAN, supra note 186, at 18 ("Courts frequently cite
many or all of these factors before concluding that by far the most important is the
right to control.") (citingJones v. Atteberry, 396 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Eagle
Trucking Co. v. Texas Bitulithic Co., 590 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), af'd in
part, rev'd in part on othergrounds, 612 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1981)); Davidson, supra,at 205
("The employer or 'master' controls and directs the details and means of the employee's or 'servant's' work. It is this element of control that distinguishes the employer-employee relationship from the independent contractor relationship at
common law.") (citing Khoury v. Edison Elect. Illuminating Co., 164 N.E. 77, 78
(Mass. 1928); Hollingbery v. Dunn 411 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Wash. 1966)); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1-2, 220 (1958); Lasswell, supa, at 423 ("Although other factors are relevant, the primary focus is on 'the right to control the physician conduct of
the service being performed.'") (quoting D & C Express, Inc. v. Sperry, 450 N.W.2d
842, 844 (Iowa 1990)). Other tests for employee status include the economic reality
test (using control test and other factors to assess employment status as a whole),
relative nature of the work test (focusing on the kind of work done by individual in
relation to the regular business of the employer), (Lasswell, supra, at 422-24); and
other, statute-specific tests on both the federal (Spencer, supra, at 671-73) and state
(Lasswell, supra, at 424-33) levels.
268 Harper,674 A.2d at 965 (emphasis added).
269 See supra note 267. The court's cited cases also only concern the employeeindependent contractor dichotomy. See Boissonnault v. Bristol Federated Church,
642 A.2d 328 (N.H. 1994) (holding that a volunteer church worker delivering financial documents to church treasury was an independent contractor, not an employee,
and thus church not reachable for injuries sustained by third party when volunteer
worker got into accident with him); Merchants Ins. Group v. Warchol, 560 A.2d 1162
(N.H. 1989) (declaratory action by insurer with court holding that injured individual
was an employee and not a subcontractor as designated by employer and thus was
under exclusionary clause of insurance policy excluding employees from coverage).
270 Puretest Ice Cream, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 806 F.2d S23, 324 (1st Cir. 1986). Courts
have refused to extend wrongful discharge actions to commercial contexts. See Pre-
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and actions based on termination against public policy are precluded.2 72 Physicians have traditionally been considered independent
contractors when providing services to hospitals and MCOs. 2 78 Under

such circumstances, health care organizations have inserted termination without cause clauses, and the courts have routinely upheld them
mier Wine & Spirits v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 846 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1988) (no cause of
action for discharge at will in commercial agreements); Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[Clourts generally conclude that
'[w] hen the right to terminate a contract is absolute under the clear wording in the
agreement [and] the motive of the party in terminating such an agreement is irrelevant to the question of whether the termination is effective."') (quoting Augusta Med.
Complex, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 608 P.2d 890, 896 (Kan. 1980)). And some courts do not
make a distinction between employees and independent contractors with respect to
the power of employer termination under an at will agreement. Daniel Adams Assocs., Inc. v. Rimbach Publ'g Co., 519 A.2d 997, 1003 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987).
271 Puretest, 806 F.2d at 324 (citing Rockwell Eng'g Co. v. Automatic Timing &
Controls Co., 559 F.2d 460, 463 (7th Cir. 1977)); see also New Horizons Elecs. Mktg.,
Inc. v. Clarion Corp., 561 N.E.2d 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (plaintiff independent contractor assertion of bad faith termination untenable and would alter specific express
terms of at will agreement); Keystone Carbon Co. v. Black, 599 N.E.2d 213, 216 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992) (no cause of action for independent contractor terminated by company under an express termination at will contract, regardless of bad faith).
272 Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (wrongful termination against public policy cause of action only applicable to employer-employee
relationships); New Horizons,561 N.E.2d at 283 (retaliatory discharge actions not tenable by independent contractors).
273 Raglin v. HMO Ill., Inc., 595 N.E.2d 153, 156 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) ("[I]n this
case there seems to be no question that HMOI is an IPA model health maintenance
organization and, therefore, does not directly employ its own physicians.... For this
reason the medical groups, and thus the physicians who work within the medical
group, may be considered independent contractors ....");Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hosp. Ass'n of Evansville, 133 N.E.2d 864, 870 (Ind.App. 1957) ("the duty of a
hospital corporation, in respect to physicians and surgeons, would be complied with
by using reasonable and ordinary care to employ reasonably qualified, reputable, licensed physicians, and in such cases the physicians or surgeons are independent contractors"); Biddle v. Sartori Mem'l Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 797 (Iowa 1994) ("a
physician is customarily regarded as an independent contractor, not an employee of
the facility served"); Chase v. Independent Practice Ass'n, Inc., 583 N.E.2d 251, 254
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) ("physicians have traditionally been viewed as independent
contractors"); Drennan v. Community Health Inv. Corp., 905 S.W.2d 811, 819 (Tex.
App. 1995) (" [a] doctor chosen by a patient is considered an independent contractor
with regard to hospitals at which he has staff privileges"); Harris v. Galveston County,
799 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App. 1990) ("Generally, a physician is considered to be an
independent contractor with regard to hospitals at which he has staff privileges."); see
also Lakes Emergency Care Physicians, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Econ. Sec., No. CO-951895, 1996 WL 81504 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1996) (physicians who worked for
temporary emergency room physician staffing company considered independent
contractors).
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under theories of breach of contract, 274 antitrust analysis, 2 75 and constitutional law.2 76 Further, injunctive relief has been denied when
physician-contractors have requested it.277 Indeed, the courts have assessed the relationship between physicians and health care organizations as one of business; and thus, a "medical business judgment rule"
applies to termination where the courts grant great discretion to the
278
business decisions of management.
Specifically in the physician termination context, as independent
contractors, physicians cannot claim wrongful discharge. Indeed, employment relationships with termination without cause clauses are not
"engrafted" with covenants of good faith and fair dealing, even when
the employer promises to renew the agreement.2 7 9 In the hornbook
case on the matter, Abrahamson v. NME Hospitals, Inc.,28 0 Abrahamson
was hired to manage the laboratory and pathology department for the
hospital under a one year contract which included within it a termination without cause clause. 28 ' The agreement was then extended by a
letter sent by the hospital to Abrahamson, indicating that the letter
"will serve as an extension of your contract which expires June 30,
1984. We will continue to do business under the terms of the contract
until a new contract is prepared for signature, in no event later than
November, 1984."282 The parties continued their relationship until
November 30, 1984, when the hospital, instead of presenting Abrahamson with a new agreement, notified him that under the terms of
the original agreement, it was exercising its power to terminate him
274

For a discussion of these claims in an exclusive contracts context, see Liang,

supra note 21, at nn.120-46 and accompanying text.
275 For a discussion of these claims in an exclusive contracts context, see id. at
nn.13-84 and accompanying text.

276 For a discussion of these claims in an exclusive contracts context, see id. at
nn.85-119 and accompanying text.
277 For a discussion of these claims in an exclusive contracts context, see id. at
nn.147-61 and accompanying text.

278 See id. at nn.173-76 and accompanying text.
279 Abrahamson v. NME Hosps., Inc., 241 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Ct. App. 1987).
280 Id.
281 Id. at 397. The clause read:

VI. TERM AND TERMINATION
B.

Either party may terminate this agreement without cause upon

ninety (90) days written notice to the other party and shall duly inform the
Hospital's Governing Board of such termination.
Id.
282 Id. (quoting letter from hospital).
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without cause.2 8 3 After the 90 day notice period ended, Abrahamson
28 4
filed SUit.
Abrahamson claimed that he was terminated by the hospital because he would "not condone or acquiesce in the hospital's failure to
provide patient care and to require staff physicians to practice good
medicine . . .. [TIhe hospital did these things to increase revenue.

'285

For this reason, Abrahamson claimed that the termination

thus represented a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing and was contrary to public policy.2 8 6 The court rejected
these claims. First, the court noted that "[dlischarge of an employee
during the term of employment contract may be a wrongful discharge
if the employee pleads and provides the discharge was for a reason
contravening fundamental principles of public policy. '28 7 However,
[t] hese concepts concerning causes of action sounding in wrongful
discharge and breach of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] arising out of the employment relationship are not on point.
Abrahamson was engaged as an independent contractor for the
term of one year under a contract terminable without cause on 90
days written notice. He was not an employee and was not dis288
charged from employee status.
Thus, even while acknowledging that there may have been a
cause of action against the hospital had Abrahamson been an employee, the court distinctly noted that because he was not, the public
2 89
policy employment at will exceptions were not available to him.
Further, the court placed great import upon the independence
of the termination without cause clause to any implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. 290 The court noted that:
[i]ndeed, the hospital and Abrahamson agree good cause was not
the reason for termination. To declare the existence of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in these circumstances engrafts
upon the agreement a requirement that the right of either party to
terminate without cause upon 90 days notice the further condition
the termination must be free of any suggestion of violation of funda291
mental public policy or of law. This we decline to do.
283
284
285

Id.
Id.
Id.

286 Id at 398.
287

Id. (citation omitted).

288 Id. at 399.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 Id.
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Thus, the court held strongly that independent contractors did
not have the status to challenge their termination without cause
clauses by "engrafting" an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
2 92
onto the agreement.
If Harper were considered to be an independent contractor,
Abrahamson2 93 would appear to be quite damaging to him. Note first
that physicians such as Harper are generally considered to be independent contractors with the healthcare entities with which they
contract. 294 In the context of Abrahamson, because termination without cause clauses do not appear to provide any protection for independent contractors under any good faith 295 or public policy
rationales, 296 Harper's sustained cause of action, and the court's reasoning, would seem specious.2 9 7 Thus, the lack of foundation based
on independent contractor law, in addition to the inapplicability of
the employment at will exceptions, 298 would appear to give Harper
and the court little room for legal recognition and remedy of his termination claim.
V.

HARPER v IEALTHSOURCE. A PoLicy OPPORTuNITY

When is a physician not an employee nor an independent contractor? When that physician works in New Hampshire and is litigating in its Supreme Court. The court, in addition to holding that
"Harper's relationship with Healthsource is not an employer-employee relationship,"' 299 also held that "Harper [is not] really an independent contractor for Healthsource ... ."300 Given that a worker
is traditionally described as either an employee or an independent
contractor,3 0 1 it is difficult to fathom by what standards the lower
court on remand should judge the case. This is all the more difficult
because the court itself did not identify or articulate any standard by
292 Id.
293 241 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Ct. App. 1987); see supra notes 279-92 and accompanying
text.
294 See supra note 273.
295 Abrahamson, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 399; see also supranotes 290-92 and accompanying
text.
296 Abrahamson, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 399; see also supranotes 272 and 289 and accompanying text.
297 The Abrahamsoncourt explicitly noted that the protections of the exceptions to
the at will employment doctrine do not apply to independent contractors. Abrahamson, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 399.
298 See supra notes 64-263 and accompanying text.
299 Harper,674 A.2d at 964.
300 Id.
301 See supra note 267.
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which to judge the case, other than indicating that the relationship
was "similar" to an employment relationship, but in the same sentence
indicating the trial court was in "error" when it treated the case as
30 2
such.
However, perhaps the mode by which the court assessed what
could be considered the relevant law may simply illustrate the court's
shrewdness. Because it appears that Harper does not have a claim
under any traditional analysis, by holding that Harper does not fall
into an employee or independent contractor category, the court gave
itself the power to develop the common law as a response to significant social change. Of course, the common law has such a jurisprudential tradition; the New Hampshire Supreme Court is thus in good
303
company if and when it placed itself in such a position.
Note, however, that any development of the law to be made by
the court must be considered in the context of a world of limited resources.30 4 The common law power should hence be used to effect
302 Harper,674 A.2d at 964.
303 See, e.g., Harlan F. Stone, Some Phases in American Legal Education, Address at Yale
University, 97 CENT. L.J. 241 (1924), where Chief Justice Stone indicated that law
should not be seen as "a hermetically sealed compartment of social science, to be
explored and its principles formulated without reference to those social and economic forces which call law into existence .... law must derive its form and substance
[from these forces], if it is to serve adequately its purpose." Id. at 244-45. This conception of law as an integral part, rather than a simple observer of, social and economic norms is a core jurisprudential concern. This development during Stone's era
on the Supreme Court is generally argued to be a direct result of the common law's
philosophical change in stance in the 19th century, again as a function of social
change. Horwitz has made this observation:
What dramatically distinguished nineteenth century common law from its
eighteenth century counterpart was the extent to which common law judges
came to play a central role in directing the course of social change....
Indeed, judges gradually began to shape common law doctrine with an increasing awareness that the impact.., had expanded beyond the necessity
merely of doing justice in the individual case.
MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 xii-xv
(1977). Indeed, the changes stem not necessarily from "crisis" cases, but from discrete cases whose changes are "almost unnoticed." KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEAIs 109 (1960); see also ALEXENDER M. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 115 (1986)

("[T]here are sound reasons, grounded not only in theory but in the judicial experience of centuries, here and elsewhere, for believing that the hard, confining and yet
enlarging context of a real controversy leads to sounder and more enduring
judgments.").
304 See, e.g., Bryan A. Liang, CocaineJustice: Why HarsherSentencesfor Crack Dealersare
Appropriate, LA. DAILYJ., Jan. 22, 1996, at 6 (arguing that limited resources require
prosecutors to target minority communities because that is where crack dealers focus
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change only if it is needed; i.e., if and when the social change results
in some negative transformation in the status of the individuals concerned. Bluntly put, the court needs to assess whether there is harm
associated with the social change. If so, a case must be considered as a
reification of the social change and potential remedies should specifically address it. If there is no harm, then the social change does not
require intervention by the court.
Thus, for the common law to have a positive impact on furthering
a social goal of progress, 30 5 its development must reflect the actual
modifications inherent in evolving relationships that come with the
relevant social change. However, these common law developments
are only justified, even in the face of significant modifications, if those
modifications in fact result in excess costs or harm.
Have there been any modifications of relationships in the social
change of managed care? It appears so. A new and unique physician
role30 6 has been identified by the court-one that is neither an employee nor an independent contractor. 30 7 This is not an implausible
characterization. In the days of traditional indemnity insurance, physicians had virtually unfettered discretion in decisionmaking. Conventional indemnity insurance provided a clear distinction between
provider and payer; the physician simply rendered services, billed the
insurance company, and was paid. There were no financial or other
limitations or controls exercised by the insurance company over the
physician under this blank check approach. Physicians then were true
independent contractors.3 0 8 And by comparison, even in those days,
there were physicians who were typical employees. For example, the
government and companies employed physicians; even managed care,
at that time a minority player, employed physicians traditionally in
staff model HMOs.3 0 9
But as the mode of health care delivery has changed, the distinction between these traditional categories for physicians has become
increasingly blurred. The physician can no longer exercise unfettered
their efforts); Bryan A. Liang, The Bottom Line Isn't Racism, It's Economics, LA DAmyJ.,
Dec. 18, 1995, at 6 (indicating that California Proposition 187 was not based upon
racist tendencies but on limited resources available which in fact inadequately cover
citizens' needs for education and non-emergency medical care).
305 As compared to the limited effect it may have as a deterrence structure. See
iHang, supra note 14.
306 See Liang, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
307 Harper,674 A.2d at 964.
308 See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
309 "In a staff model HMO, the participating physicians are employees. The HMO
typically pays them on a salary basis, with bonus or incentive payments based on performance and profits." YOUNGER ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
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discretion in his or her clinical decisionmaking.3 10 The MCO, in fact,
has the power to control the physician on the most practical of all
bases-financial. 3 11 Yet the physician continues to be a professional,
and, for example, like Harper, need not provide all of his services to
one master.3 12 He or she may contract with several entities and indeed provide services at his or her own location, clearly outside the
bounds of the typical employee and clearly within the bounds of the
typical independent contractor. 3 13 Thus, although the court's reasoning in support of its decision may have been questionable, its characterization was right-Harper is neither a traditional employee nor a
traditional independent contractor in the health care context. This
new genre of worker is a modification created by the social change; it
is thus a necessary component for consideration if the common law is
to be developed in this area.
Have there been any other modifications? It appears that the patient's options have been limited as well. Recall that the previous relationships between physicians and patients were in the era of
traditional indemnity. Among other things, patients had their own
virtually unfettered discretion-their choice of provider. The patient
could always follow the physician if he or she wished. Neither a patient's change of employer, nor a physician's change of medical situs
or group severed the relationship. Only the patient made that
decision.
But now we are in a brave new world where things have significantly changed. As is apparent, third parties can and do interpose
themselves into the patient-physician relationship to the point of severing it without the patient's assent-through deselection. Thus,
although the actual physician and patient remain the same, from the
patient's point of view, a new risk of uncontrollable physician loss has
resulted from the new dominant social infrastructure known as managed care. This modification should also be considered when determining the extent to which the common law should be developed, if
at all.
The physician's role has changed, and the patient has lost autonomy. However, if there is no apparent impact or harm associated with
these new changes, no action is in fact necessary. Is there no cost or
no harm emanating from the modifications of the patient-physician
relationship under the social change of managed care? Although in
310
311
312
313

See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958).
Id.
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many circumstances there may be little harm by deselection to patients who are not sick, 314 there is indeed the potential for a great deal
of harm for the minority of patients who are. 3 15
Back in the days of traditional indemnity, this potential patient
injury was not a risk. Thus, the courts did not need to address the
issue because any harm associated with a theoretical termination was
just that-theoretical, since the patient with indemnity insurance was
never required to involuntarily sever his or her medical ties. Now,
however, in those circumstances where patients have sensitive diseases
such as chronic illness (e.g., diabetes, end-stage renal disease),316 terminable diseases such as the myriad forms of cancer, 317 "intimate" but
non-terminal diseases such as those involving the genital tract,
AIDS,3 1 8 and other sensitive diseases,3 19 termination of an established
patient-physician relationship requires the patient to undergo the significant burden of obtaining the services of another physician with its
concomitant costs associated with, importantly, reestablishing confidence and trust in the physician and his or her staff. In addition,
there are the large practical costs to both the patient and the new
physician associated with recounting and analyzing the patient's past
314 "Like so many other aspects of American culture, managed care rewards winners-stay healthy and you're fine." Swartz, supra note 17, at 86.
315 See infra notes 316-21 and accompanying text.
316 Any long-term, life-threatening illness represents a threat to [the MCO's] bottom line. "When we started seeing insurance companies trying to shaft these
guys," says one physician who was treating AIDS patients for more than a decade,
"we knew they were going to extrapolate that to cancer patients or heart patients.
They'd do it to anybody."
Swartz, supra note 17.
317 Dr. B [a family practitioner) was not the only one wrangling with the insurance
companies. One morning a woman [in an MCO plan] came weeping into his
office. Her oncologist had been dropped from the plan, and she could not afford
to pay him on her own. The man had been her doctor for a dozen years and had
guided her through not only her own ongoing treatment but also the death of
her husband from the same disease. "I cannot bear facing a recurrence without
him," she told Dr. B. But she would have to.

Id
318 AIDS is the most glaring example [of difficulties with not maintaining a patient-physician relationship]. Even though the disease is terminal, the right doctor can make an enormous difference in the quality and length of time a patient
has left. But ask an AIDS doctor about managed care and you get horror stories
in return... [for example,] of doctors fired from plans because they fought back.
Id.
319 These considerations should also be applied to patients who are pregnant; disruption of pre- and post-natal care could have a potentially devastating effect on the
mother and child and should also be considered a medical state warranting a continued patient-physician relationship. See Terry, supra note 6, at 138 (describing how
one physician, Dr. Marciana Wilkerson, was deselected while her patients were pregnant, two with gestational diabetes).
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history of his or her present illness, physical exams, previous testing,
previous therapies attempted and their results, and previous medications attempted and their effects. Of course all these new costs and
their associated time allocations have a significant impact on the patient's health and the quality of care that is delivered-while merely
320
reinventing the wheel.
And further, there are incentive costs accompanying physician
deselection that must be overcome by the patient. In managed care,
320 Long-term patient-physician relationships do not simply confer psychic benefits. If physicians have a basic understanding of their patients, particularly those with
complex, sensitive diseases, they can then better evaluate their patients' signs and
symptoms. Further, because medicine is not a black and white endeavor and there
are significant variations as to patient expression, the physician with a longstanding
relationship with a patient can assess better those reactions which require immediate
action and those which do not. As well, with long term relationships, patients who
trust and have confidence in their physicians are more apt to see their physicians early
in a disease's progression rather than later, when the disease becomes more difficult
to treat. This continuity of care also has been shown to lead to greater patient satisfaction and a higher probability of patient compliance with medical treatment. See
David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-PhysicianRelationship, 5 HEALTH
MATRIX 141, 143 (1995). Further, maintaining a long term physician relationship
arguably is more efficient and can result in higher quality of care. Indeed, as indicated in the text, when a patient changes physicians, a litany of events must occur so
that the new physician can obtain some baseline information about the patient. However, inevitably, the new physician will have to rely on at least some second-hand information from the previous physician's notes and notations in the medical record. This
sacrifices the complete understanding of the patient that is garnered through a long
term relationship and potentially reduces the quality of care that the patient will receive from the new physician. See id. at 144. Additionally, there may be long term
effects on the patients due to a disruption of an established patient-physician relationship. Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not To Compete Between Physicians:
ProtectingDoctors' Interests at Patient'sExpense, 45 RuTGERS L. Rav. 1, 31 (1992).
Further, long term, continuous relationships are reported to reduce emergency
room visits; as well, intensive care stays of patients with continuing relationships with
physicians are shorter compared with those patients who lack such a relationship. Id.
at 31-32. This may be because a long term relationship may contribute to a physician's diagnostic abilities. Id. It appears that patients who have had their patientphysician relationships severed involuntarily require a significant amount of time to
find an acceptable replacement, obtain care from the emergency room more frequently for non-emergency care, and require two to five years after a new physician is
found to "feel confident that their new physician knows their medical problems well
and more than five years to trust that their emotional problems are understood." Id.
at 33-34. Thus,
medical research on continuity and discontinuity in provider care has established that the involuntary loss of a primary care physician is a significant
physical and psychological hardship and may be experienced by the patient
for an extended period. Public policy... should foster provider continuity
in health care, not undermine it.
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there is a financial incentive to do less; thus, patients who are ill are
those with the highest negative risk for the provider and the MCO
because these patients will have the highest costs associated with their
care. This makes them extremely undesirable: the MCO may lose
money on these patients and the physician may be deselected due to
the patients' high cost profile. So simply because the patient is afflicted with disease, his or her potential for harm is not only that associated with his or her physician's deselection per se, but also the cost
associated with involuntary and more frequent physician shopping as
compared with those patients who are not sick (and thus are more
financially desirable) .S21 However, these sick patients are the very individuals who need the most intensive and stable care and accrue the
most harm by delay. Hence, deselection and the current managed
care infrastructure add insult to injury to the vulnerable patient by
taking his or her physician away and making it more difficult to find
another.
Thus, there have been modifications in the patient-physician relationship and identifiable costs and harms associated with the managed care form of health delivery and finance. These modifications
and particularly the significant costs, virtually unheard of in the indemnity world, argue for some change in social policy to take into
account these new roles and risks accompanying the sweeping
changes in health care delivery.
Coming full circle, Harperprovides that opportunity through the
common law. Since the new developments arising from the shift of
medical care delivery forms into managed care have created new risks
of patient injury (i.e., the costs and harms), the deselection issue
should be assessed in an attempt to avoid these costs and harms. The
source of these costs and harms is the break-up of the patient-physician relationship; the crux of the solution thus must focus on maintaining these relationships for these patients.
Id. at 34. This is particularly important for those with sensitive disease conditions
which would make any of the potential problems of discontinuity of care magnified
with concomitant potentially devastating results.
321 The professional ethos has limited to some extent financial concerns regarding the care to be received. See Liang, supra note 13. Undoubtedly, some physicians
will continue to uphold their ethic; others will leave the profession because of their
inherent inability to accept managed care's terms and limitations. However, others,
with little choice, must accept these terms: those with families, bills to pay, children in
college, parents in nursing homes, and relatives with cancer, AIDS, and other expensive diseases. These physicians must work because they need to support themselves
and the loved ones who rely on them. Thus, these doctors must accept the terms of
their managed care agreements, curry favor with those who maintain the provider
lists, and make no trouble lest they be deselected resulting in financial death.
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To do this, the court should allow a physician "defense" against
deselection which allows continuance of the patient-physician relationship 322 if the physician has patients who wish to continue the relationship and the patients are within a defined sensitive disease state
category. This "defense" would preserve the most important and critical patient-physician relationships while avoiding the harms associated
with their severance. Further, by preserving medical relationships
only for those substantively affected by the social change, deselection
could continue to be a viable business tool. And, by recognizing a
deselection standard based on a patient-centered viewpoint, the court
can express its condemnation of potential bad faith against vulnerable
patients/enrollees and affirm a public policy of weighing the existence of harm to these patients and indicate concrete actions MCOs
can take to avoid these harms.3 23 This "defense" would also give substance to the court's statement that "the termination of [Harper's]
relationship with Healthsource affects more than just his own interest"3 24 by identifying specifically who is affected and by what rationale
and methodology those interests should be assessed and protected.
Thus, this physician "defense" against deselection would take into account the new role of the physician, the new patient risks created by
the managed care infrastructure, and the new potential costs and
losses that may be placed upon certain vulnerable patient populations
while simultaneously recognizing a world of limited financial
resources.
Other proposals have some similarities. New federal legislation
allows patients to maintain health insurance across employment
through portability provisions (the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPA)). 3 25 Although this statute addresses the maintenance of insurance, it does not address the substantive issue of the actual health of most vulnerable patients and the care
322 Interestingly, New Hampshire enacted a law which would allow patients to
maintain their physicians for a minimum of five years if the patient loses the physician
due to an exclusive contractual arrangement with another MCO. However, this law
focuses on the elimination of exclusive contracts rather than addressing directly the
problem of deselection. Of course, a marginal step could include amending the law
to cover deselection. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 420-I:1-:7 (1996).
323 This is consistent with Learned Hand's well known B < PL formula, where if
the injurer can spend some amount (B) that is less than the expected harm to the
victim (calculated by multiplying the probability of harm (P) times the loss if it occurs
(L)), then the injurer should spend the amount (B). United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
324 Harper,674 A.2d at 966.
325 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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they receive. A sensitive disease state patient may carry insurance between different employers, but that does not assist him or her in obtaining the optimal care if a physician change is required and does
little to alleviate the tremendous burden 32 6 on the patient who can
least withstand it.
This proposal, allowing only vulnerable patients to maintain their
patient-physician relationships, would not affect most of the managed
care infrastructure so its marginal costs should be limited-certainly,
much less than the HIPA portability provisions will entail. And, as a

point of comparison, other proposals such as "any willing provider
laws" 327 (AWPs) which have the same effect are much broader; they
would effectively allow the physician common law "defense" to
deselection for any and all patients. These broad and all-inclusive
AWPs have been estimated to potentially increase the health premium
costs for a family by $1248 and individuals by $458 annually. 3 2s Assuming that this entire increase in cost would apply to the more limited
proposal of allowing only those with sensitive disease states to maintain their patient-physician relationships through the common law
"defense," the increase would still dwarf the costs associated with care
if the patient were required to pay the entire cost of treatment out-ofpocket; it would also avoid the non-pecuniary costs attendant with
3 29
physician change.
Of course, although Harperdoes provide an opportunity for such
a policy change, the most efficient method would be through the leg326 See supra notes 316 21 and accompanying text.
327 Any willing provider laws are statutes that place a duty upon MCOs to allow all
providers who fulfill the MCO requirements for service provision to participate in the
MCO as a selected provider. Thus, the power of the MCO to deselect is non-existent
as long as the provider complies with the MCO's criteria. See supra note 15. At least
26 states have passed some form of any willing provider laws. Jan Ziegler, Turning Up
the Heat on Managed Care, 14 Bus. & HEALTH 33 (1996). However, first, few cover
physician services; and second, it is questionable whether these laws will impact the
significant proportion of enrollees covered by ERISA plans. Janice Somerville, States
Chip Away at HMOs with Regulations,AM. MED. NEws, Apr. 22, 1996, at 10.
328 Julie Johnsson, State Laws on Managed Care Spur New Battles, AM. MED. NEws,
July 24, 1995, at 3.
329 This proposal would in fact require that patients pay this increased marginal
cost (perhaps with the any willing provider law increase estimates as a cap). However,
for a family or individual facing the costs associated with sensitive disease states to pay
for treatments for such diseases as cancer (e.g., chemotherapy, bone marrow transplants, etc.), an additional $100 per month for families and $40 per month for individuals would be minimal as compared to the cost of attempting to maintain a chosen
patient-physician relationship and the pecuniary and non-pecuniary costs of treatment and change thereof. See also supra notes 316-21 and accompanying text.
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islative process. 330 If Congress recognizes the extensive social ills associated with terminated patient-physician relationships for patients
with highly sensitive disease states, and passes such legislation consonant with the proposal described herein (perhaps as an amendment
to HIPA331 ), there would be a significant alleviation of the difficulties
these patients face when their physicians are deselected. And since
this dictate would be through Congress, it would have national application, and thus, standard rules and amounts as to the disease states to
be covered and the additional costs to be borne by the patients could
be made at the federal level, avoiding redundant regulations by each
of the states. However, probably more realistic because of legislative
inertia,3 3 2 will be the use of the common law-i.e., Harper.But regardless of the source from which the legal change emanates, the policy
goals outlined here first requires the key recognition that it is too
costly from a societal point of view to constantly force the creation of
new patient-physician relationships for sensitive disease state patients
due to an involuntary change of physician because of a third party's
business needs.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If Harperis a blow for maintaining patient-physician relationships,
it is a glancing blow at best. However, it provides a window of opportunity for action to protect the most unprotected of patient interests
in the current health delivery climate. The case appears to be the first
general case of deselection where the court has allowed for a review of
the actual merits of termination of the physician rather than simply
reviewing the process by which it was accomplished.3 3 3 Although the
decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court does not square with
much of the traditional case law in the area, it appropriately recog330 Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HAv. L.
REV. 1717 (1982) (indicating that legislation is a more efficient and effective method
to achieve social change than common law).

331 See supra note 325.
332 No matter how little dispute there is as to the desirability of such legislation,
there is comparatively little chance of overcoming legislative inertia and securing
its passage unless some accident happens to focus attention upon it. The best
hope is that the courts will feel free to take appropriate action without specific
legislation authorizing them to do so.
Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 517 (1947) (Black,J., dissenting) (quoting Roger
S. Foster, Place of Trial-Interstate Application of Intrastate Methods of Adjustment, 44
HARv. L. REV. 41, 52 (1930)).
333 Note that in Ambrosino v. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Cal.
1995), the court reviewed the deselection termination itself due to potential violations
of Ambrosino's civil rights; see supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text,
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nizes a new physician status which can allow the social issues created
by fracturing patient-physician relationships under deselection to be
addressed. By focusing on the newly created burden on vulnerable
patients and allowing them to continue their medical relationships
through a physician defense to deselection, the patient harm avoided
by the machinations required when these sensitive disease patients
must find other providers would be substantial. A vulnerable patient's
health status is an expensive chip to play in this country's efforts at
cost containment. Hence, it is important to assure that the managed
care revolution and its concurrent effects include a mandate, or an
incentive, for MCOs to manage care in the best interest of at least its
most vulnerable patients rather than simply managing costs. 34 Harper
has given this country that opportunity as it moves almost totally into a
system of managed care.

334 In an attempt to assure that the patient and his or her care is an important
focus in managed care decisions, placing a fiduciary duty on the managed care
organization may effect a positive change. At least this would give the substantive
decision-maker some incentive [in addition] to the simple management of
costs-an incentive to provide medical care in the patient's best interest.
Liang, supra note 13, at 6.

